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Comment
LOOKING FOR A LORAX: ENVIRONMENTAL PROSECUTION AND
REGULATORY FAILINGS IN OVERSEEING PENNSYLVANIA’S
FRACKING INDUSTRY
BLAIRE L. BERNSTEIN*
“It is not yet widely understood, though it will be, that when a government
relaxes regulations on coal-fired plants or erases scientific data from a
federal website, it is guilty of more than merely bowing to corporate
interests; it commits crimes against humanity.”1
I.

THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC LANDSCAPE OF FRACKING IN PA:
“[B]USINESS IS BUSINESS! AND BUSINESS MUST GROW”2

The inception of the fracking boom can be traced roughly to 2005, when the
first Marcellus Shale well started producing gas in southwestern Pennsylvania. 3 Only
two years later, regulatory agencies had issued almost four hundred permits for
drilling and fracking.4 By 2010, the oil and natural gas industry had drilled more than
three thousand wells and received almost ten thousand permits. 5 The process of

* J.D. Candidate 2022, Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law; M. Phil. 2019,
Trinity College Dublin; B.A. 2018, Villanova University. This Comment is dedicated to my family
for their constant love and support. I would also like to thank the professors and lawyers who
have introduced me to and guided me through the field of environmental law, namely, Todd
Aagaard, Ruth Gordon, Kathryn Urbanowicz, and Alex Bomstein. Lastly, I would like to thank all
the members of Villanova Law Review who have provided thoughtful feedback throughout the
writing and publication process.
1. RONALD C. KRAMER, CARBON CRIMINALS, CLIMATE CRIMES 125, 125 (2020) (quoting
NATHANIEL RICH, LOSING EARTH: A RECENT HISTORY 195 (2019)) (discussing Obama and
Trump administrations’ failures adequately addressing climate change).
2. DR. SEUSS, THE LORAX 37 (1971).
3. See Candy Woodall, The Rise and Fall—and Rise?—of Pa.’s Oil and Gas Industry, PENNLIVE
(last
updated
Jan.
5,
2019),
https://www.pennlive.com/news/2016/03/the_rise_and_fall_and_rise_of.html
[https://perma.cc/HQ6U-CK4S] (detailing expansion of fracking industry in Pennsylvania and its
effect on the state and its citizens); see also Hobart M. King, Marcellus Shale—Appalachian Basin
Natural Gas Play, GEOSCIENCE NEWS & INFO., https://geology.com/articles/marcellusshale.shtml [https://perma.cc/R8SF-3CHE] (last visited Sept. 29, 2020) (“The Marcellus Shale,
also referred to as the Marcellus Formation, is a Middle Devonian-age, black, low-density,
carbonaceous (organic-rich) shale that occurs in the subsurface beneath much of Ohio, West
Virginia, Pennsylvania and New York” with experts estimating it could contain up to “141 trillion
cubic feet” of recoverable natural gas.).
4. See Woodall, supra note 3 (noting industry received rapidly increasing number of oil wells
and permits in beginning of fracking boom).
5. See id. (tracing fracking boom’s expansive drilling activities). Despite these large-scale
numbers, a decade later Attorney General Shapiro’s grand jury report noted this is merely the
beginning for the fracking industry. See PA. OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GEN., REPORT 1 OF THE

(17)
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fracking, or hydraulic fracturing, involves drilling vertically and horizontally into the
ground before injecting highly pressurized mixtures of water, sand, and chemicals in
order to extract oil and gas from shale rock. 6 This fracking technique allowed the
oil and natural gas industry (the industry) to tap into previously unreachable oil
reserves in Pennsylvania’s Marcellus Shale.7
The industry’s rapid expansion brought more residents and economic growth
to rural areas of Pennsylvania and introduced a reliable domestic supply of oil to the
United States.8 The industry began contributing millions of dollars to political
campaigns, championing fracking as a clean alternative to coal while bringing in over
eleven-billion dollars and 140,000 jobs to the Pennsylvania economy in 2010 alone. 9
Despite its economic benefits, the fracking process is environmentally controversial
due to its use of large amounts of water, its potential for water and soil pollution,
and the air contamination released around drilling sites.10 While the industry spread
across the state, leasing more than a quarter of Pennsylvania’s land by 2011,

FORTY-THIRD STATEWIDE INVESTIGATING GRAND JURY 13 (2020) [hereinafter PA. OFFICE OF
ATTORNEY GEN., GRAND JURY REPORT], https://www.attorneygeneral.gov/wpcontent/uploads/2020/06/FINAL-fracking-report-w.responses-with-page-number-V2.pdf
[https://perma.cc/DMQ4-KMRV] (“Experts anticipate that there will be another 30,000 to 40,000
unconventional wells drilled in the Marcellus shale in the coming years.”).
6. See What Is Fracking and Why Is It Controversial?, BBC (Oct. 15, 2018),
https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-14432401 [https://perma.cc/VSF7-4KTE] (describing technical
background, economic advantages, and controversial environmental effects of fracking process).
7. See King, supra note 3 (stating Marcellus Shale not considered a productive source of
natural gas until fracking made process feasible and fruitful).
8. See Woodall, supra note 3 (examining industry’s transformative effects on Pennsylvania’s
economy and oil dependency within United States). According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics,
from 2007 to 2012, while total employment was declining in Pennsylvania, the oil and natural gas
industry saw an employment increase of 259.3%. See Jennifer Cruz, Peter W. Smith & Sara Stanley,
The Marcellus Shale Gas Boom in Pennsylvania: Employment and Wage Trends, MONTHLY LAB. REV., U.S.
BUREAU OF LAB. STATS., Feb. 2014, at 1, 5, https://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2014/article/themarcellus-shale-gas-boom-in-pennsylvania.htm [https://perma.cc/S4G6-GKRJ] (comparing
Pennsylvania’s overall employment and wage trends to those of oil and natural gas industry).
Additionally, oil and natural gas wages increased by 36.3% while the average wage increased only
by 11.9%. Id. Employment in areas of southwestern Pennsylvania increased by 287% from 2007
to 2012. Id.
9. See Woodall, supra note 3 (considering industry’s financial involvement in political
campaigns both nationally and in Commonwealth of Pennsylvania); see also Timothy J. Considine,
Robert Watson & Seth Blumsack, The Pennsylvania Marcellus Natural Gas Industry: Status, Economic
Impacts and Future Potential, PA. ST. UNIV. COLL. OF EARTH & MINERAL SCI. DEP’T OF ENERGY &
MINERAL ENG’G (July 20, 2011), http://pasbdc.org/uploads/media_items/the-pennsylvaniamarcellus-natural-gas-industry-status-economic-impacts-and-future-potential-july2011.original.pdf [https://perma.cc/QHQ4-3DGG] (“This update finds that during 2010
Pennsylvania Marcellus natural gas development generated $11.2 billion in value added or the
regional equivalent of gross domestic product, contributed $1.1 billion in state and local tax
revenues, and supported nearly 140,000 jobs.”(citation omitted)).
10. See Caroline Cecot, No Fracking Way: An Empirical Investigation of Local Shale Development
Bans in New York, 48 ENVTL. L. 761, 767 (2018) (describing daily realities of fracking on local
communities such as extensive noise and disruption, “air pollution, drilling and road accidents, fluid
spills,” well blowouts, contamination of groundwater and surface water, and water shortages); What
Is Fracking and Why Is It Controversial?, supra note 6 (describing fracking’s adverse environmental
consequences).
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environmental regulatory agencies at both the state and federal level struggled to
keep up with overseeing this new process.11
During this time, citizens began submitting complaints to the Pennsylvania
Department of Environmental Protection (DEP).12 Between 2004 and 2016,
citizens across the state made 9,442 complaints to the DEP, none of which were
made public until investigative journalists formally requested them. 13 In 2016, Josh
Shapiro campaigned for Pennsylvania Attorney General on a platform that included
prosecuting the fracking industry for crimes against Pennsylvania citizens. 14 Once
elected, Attorney General Shapiro upheld his campaign promise by launching an
investigation into Pennsylvania’s fracking industry and the effectiveness of the
DEP’s oversight measures.15
Attorney General Shapiro’s grand jury report and the DEP’s response provide
a glimpse into how Pennsylvania officials could better regulate the industry. 16
Currently, the DEP has the authority to refer an environmental criminal matter to
11. See Woodall, supra note 3 (discussing regulatory agencies’ inability to keep up with quickly
expanding industry); see also PA. OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GEN., GRAND JURY REPORT, supra note
5, at 105 (noting fracking techniques and chemicals were “standard operating procedures for
virtually every conventional oil and gas well in Pennsylvania for decades—[but] the sheer scale of
this new development was unprecedented”).
12. See Melissa A. Troutman et al., Hidden Data Suggests Fracking Created Widespread, Systematic
Impact in Pennsylvania, PUB. HERALD (Jan. 23, 2017), https://publicherald.org/hidden-datasuggests-fracking-created-widespread-systemic-impact-in-pennsylvania/
[https://perma.cc/23DL-4P2V] (describing process of making complaint to DEP about fracking
activities under Title 58, Section 3218 of Pennsylvania Oil and Gas Act). In response to this
increasing volume of complaints surrounding the industry, the DEP could “conduct its own
complaint analysis and report those findings to the state legislature, which has the power to either
limit the expansion of fracking, increase the breadth of DEP’s resources, or both.” Id. However,
the DEP did not take this measure. See id. (criticizing the DEP’s handling of increase in complaints
resulting from fracking boom).
13. See id. (stating complaints were held as “confidential” and only made available after
several requests, including a Right-to-Know request, were sent to the DEP). The citizen complaint
data revealed several disconcerting facts: the DEP received an average of about one complaint per
well, indicating that “unconventional wells, for whatever reason, generate more complaints per
well” than other types of drilling operations. See id. (quoting Dr. John Stolz’s comment that wells
related to fracking seem to cause more issues for residents than their conventional counterparts).
Of the 4,108 complaints relating to water supply, the DEP claimed that 94% of these complaints
were “completely unrelated to oil and gas,” which means that “thousands of people in shale gas
counties, living near fracking operations, are experiencing water problems that DEP claims have
nothing to do with oil and gas.” Id. (asking why the DEP claims fracking is not causing a majority
of complaints when increase in frequency correlates with rise in and location of unconventional
drilling wells).
14. See Reid Frazier, In Pa., an Echo of the Fracking Boom: Prosecutors Eye Potential ‘Environmental
Crimes.’
Here’s a Closer Look, ST. IMPACT (May 2, 2019, 8:47 P.M.),
https://stateimpact.npr.org/pennsylvania/2019/05/02/in-pa-an-echo-of-the-fracking-boomprosecutors-eye-potential-environmental-crimes-heres-a-closer-look-at-the-effort/
[https://perma.cc/N8DZ-MBBQ] (revealing former Pennsylvania chief deputy attorney general
couldn’t “imagine a scenario where the attorney general’s office could investigate the DEP for
failing to do its job” since, typically, “environmental crimes are reserved for individuals or
companies—not government agencies”).
15. See id. (reporting the DEP hired “four criminal defense firms to represent the department
and its employees” in response to grand jury investigation).
16. See PA. OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GEN., GRAND JURY REPORT, supra note 5, at 93, 152
(listing grand jury’s recommendations for regulating oil and gas industry moving forward and the
DEP’s responses to those recommendations).
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the Attorney General’s office for investigation and prosecution. 17 This power,
according to the grand jury report, is “virtually never invoked.”18 More referrals,
and subsequently more investigations and prosecutions for crimes surrounding
fracking activities, could make the industry safer and more closely supervised. 19
Following and updating rules that are already in place, such as the “zone of
presumption” rule and water quality testing criteria, would help the DEP better
respond to citizen complaints.20 Lastly, although the general assembly is in charge
of passing legislation, the DEP makes the regulations that contain the specific
provisions governing oil and gas wells.21 Passing stricter regulations would help the
DEP better control the industry and minimize its adverse effects on Pennsylvania
residents.22
This Comment contends that agency inaction should be curtailed through
outsourcing of environmental criminal investigative power to executive offices and
through legislation that penalizes agency omissions.23 Part II outlines Attorney
General Shapiro’s grand jury report and provides an overview of the case law and
statutory provisions governing environmental prosecution of both private
individuals and government employees. Part III analyzes how the framework of
environmental prosecution applied to the facts laid out in the grand jury report could
rationally lead to criminal charges for regulatory agency employees, but Part IV
contends that increasing oversight through executive powers and legislation would
be more effective than employee criminal charges. Part V explores the impact of
implementing these measures.

17. See id. at 149.
18. See id. at 101–02 (questioning why the DEP rarely uses power of criminal referral to curb
misconduct occurring around unconventional drilling). “[T]he lack of criminal prosecution is not
because no such crimes have been committed.” Id. at 102.
19. See id. at 102 (arguing that granting Office of Attorney General concurrent jurisdiction
to investigate and prosecute environmental crimes would help fulfill Pennsylvania’s constitutional
promise of clean and healthy environment).
20. See id. at 6 (accusing the DEP of failing to carry out their existing powers of water quality
testing and “zone of presumption,” which puts burden on well operator to prove there was no
contamination after suspected leak). The Attorney General also cited other instances of regulatory
powers left unused, such as DEP employees deciding not to inspect reported violations, failing to
notify neighbors of nearby contaminations, and issuing few Notice of Violations. See id.
21. See id. at 140, 142 (explaining certain standards were set through statutes enacted by
general assembly). Despite the general assembly’s legislative powers, the DEP can create more
specific rules through regulations, policies, and technical documents that industry actors must
comply with.
See The Basics of the Regulatory Process, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
https://www.epa.gov/laws-regulations/basics-regulatory-process
[https://perma.cc/U3VBN9UB] (last visited Nov. 28, 2020) (clarifying an environmental agency’s role in rulemaking
process);
see
also
Regulatory
Agendas,
PA.
DEP’T
OF
ENVTL.
PROT.,
https://www.dep.pa.gov/publicparticipation/pages/regulatory-agendas-.aspx
[https://perma.cc/RBZ9-NY6Y] (last visited Nov. 28, 2020) (stating the DEP publishes biannual
agenda for proposed regulations in addition to lists of non-regulatory sources that guide the DEP
in creating policies and procedures).
22. See PA. OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GEN., GRAND JURY REPORT, supra note 5, at 96
(suggesting stricter regulations for gathering lines, the smaller lines that transport gas to larger
pipelines); see also 25 PA. CODE § 78a.68 (2016) (listing requirements the DEP’s unconventional
well regulations imposed on gathering lines).
23. For a further analysis of how to reduce harmful agency inaction through legislative and
executive oversight, see infra Part IV.
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II. “THERE’S NO CAUSE FOR ALARM. . . . I AM DOING NO HARM.”24:
BACKGROUND ON ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT AND THE GRAND JURY
REPORT FINDINGS
In the United States, environmental crimes were not prosecuted and enforced
until the 1980s, when Congress passed federal environmental statutes. 25 When faced
with an individual or corporation violating environmental laws, regulatory agencies
have a range of enforcement options that includes both civil and criminal recourse.26
They can issue administrative compliance orders, bring civil enforcement actions, or
participate in criminal prosecutions in conjunction with the Department of Justice.27
Prosecutors and agencies typically reserve criminal charges for cases of extremely
culpable action and serious injury.28 The mens rea for most environmental crimes
is “knowingly” for felonies and “negligently” for misdemeanors. 29 While this gives
prosecutors substantial discretion in environmental cases, most defendants who
were criminally charged committed violations that “involved harm, deceptive or
misleading conduct, or operating outside the regulatory scheme.” 30

24. See SEUSS, supra note 2, at 24. In response to why the DEP was holding citizen
complaints about contaminated water supplies as confidential, a DEP attorney responded that
“Deputy Secretary Scott Perry didn’t want complaints to ‘cause alarm.’” See Troutman et al., supra
note 12 (describing arduous process of accessing complaints records that were improperly being
held confidential).
25. See David M. Uhlmann, Environmental Crimes Come of Age: The Evolution of Criminal
Enforcement in the Environmental Regulatory Scheme, 2009 UTAH L. REV. 1223, 1224 (2009) [hereinafter
Uhlmann, Environmental Crimes].
The enactment and amendments of the federal Clean Air Act, the Clean Water Act,
the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
(“CERCLA”), and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (“RCRA”) during the
1970s and 1980s brought more than the birth of the environmental crimes program in
the United States. . . . As a result, the 1980s brought a series of “firsts” for
environmental criminal enforcement: the first felony prosecutions under each of the
major environmental laws, the first knowing endangerment cases, and the first jail
sentences imposed for environmental crime under the federal sentencing guidelines.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
26. See TODD AAGAARD, DAVE OWEN, & JUSTIN PIDOT, PRACTICING ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW 144–48 (Robert C. Clark et al. eds., 1st ed. 2017) (discussing varying degrees of enforcement
actions that can be taken by regulatory agencies, government authorities, and citizens).
27. See id. at 144, 146–47. If an agency believes an individual or entity will observe with an
administrative compliance order, they will likely bring this over civil or criminal charges save time
and litigation expenses. See id. at 144. Civil and criminal litigation is a viable option for repeat
offenders who are unlikely to follow an administrative compliance order. See id.
28. See id. at 147 (stating criminal enforcement of environmental violations usually reserved
for cases involving “egregious violations” or cases “that combine environmental violations with
dishonesty or malicious motives”).
29. See Uhlmann, Environmental Crimes, supra note 25, at 1235 (explaining that “knowing”
culpability requirement for environmental crimes supplanted “willfully or negligently” standard and
includes knowledge of underlying facts of crime, but not knowledge of law being broken).
30. See David M. Uhlmann, Prosecutorial Discretion and Environmental Crime, 38 HARV. ENVTL.
L. REV. 159, 214–15 (2014) [hereinafter Uhlmann, Prosecutorial Discretion] (arguing large amount of
discretion given to prosecutors regarding environmental crimes is appropriate given nature of
environmental violations and has been exercised properly). The prosecutorial trend of only
bringing criminal environmental charges on violators who are harming individuals, defrauding
federal and state agencies, or attempting to evade government regulations demonstrates that
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Another potential tool for prosecuting environmental crimes is a grand jury,
which has the power to investigate prospective criminal offenses.31 Grand juries do
not determine whether a party is guilty or innocent, but rather decide if a case has
enough evidence to bring charges against a party.32 Thus, a grand jury does not have
the power to convict, but its broad evidentiary powers enable prosecutors to conduct
detailed investigations into criminal charges to bring later to court.33 Attorney
General Shapiro’s grand jury report does not bring any charges against the DEP but
lays out the evidence of the agency’s failure to regulate the fracking industry.34
A. Summarizing the Grand Jury Report
On June 25, 2020, Attorney General Shapiro released the Forty-Third Statewide
Grand Jury Report investigating the shale gas and fracking industry in Pennsylvania
and its detrimental effects on the property, health, and safety of the afflicted
Pennsylvania residents.35 Remarkably, the report focused not on the industry itself
but rather on the “systematic failure of the state environment and health
departments in regulating the industry and protecting public health.” 36 After two

prosecutors typically act appropriately within the law and the bounds of their discretion when
bringing environmental actions. See id. (offering evidence to support claim environmental
prosecutors act reasonably within their discretionary powers).
31. See 42 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. § 4541 (1980) (naming this subchapter the
“Investigating Grand Jury Act,” which states definitions, processes, and powers of grand jury).
32. See Charles Thompson, What Is a Grand Jury, and How Does It Work, PENNLIVE,
https://www.pennlive.com/news/2018/08/what_is_a_grand_jury.html
[https://perma.cc/47NC-44TL] (last updated Jan. 29, 2019) (clarifying role of statewide
investigating grand juries within Pennsylvania’s legal framework).
33. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 4548(c) (1980) (“Except for the power to indict, the
investigating grand jury shall have every power available to any other grand jury in the
Commonwealth.”).
34. See PA. OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GEN., GRAND JURY REPORT, supra note 5, at 104–10.
In response to the grand jury report’s condemnation of how it handled the fracking industry, the
DEP pointed out the culpability of federal environmental agencies, the legislature, and its own lack
of funding and resources that led to Pennsylvania’s regulatory shortcomings. See id. at 109.
Despite the seriousness of the allegations in the report, there is no discussion of the
environmental laws that establish—and in important ways limit—the scope of
governmental oversight of the industry. There is no acknowledgment of the
fundamental “checks and balances” principle of government that the Legislature writes
the laws, and the Governor and his agencies implement those laws.
Id. at 109–10.
35. See Susan Phillips, Criminal Defense Counsel Represents DEP in Mariner East Probe, ST.
IMPACT PA, https://stateimpact.npr.org/pennsylvania/2019/08/30/criminal-defense-counselrepresents-dep-in-mariner-east-probe/ [https://perma.cc/58VL-GF86] (last updated Sept. 3,
2019) (“The Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection has engaged a criminal
defense attorney to represent at least one employee with regard to a criminal investigation of the
Mariner East pipeline project—a move several environmental attorneys said is unusual and possibly
unprecedented for the regulatory agency.”); see also PA. OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GEN., GRAND JURY
REPORT, supra note 5, at 1 (concluding poor government oversight led to officials “not do[ing]
enough to properly protect the health, safety and welfare of thousands of Pennsylvania citizens
who were affected by this industry”).
36. See Don Hopey & Laura Legere, State AG Shapiro: Grand Jury Report Reveals Pa.’s Systematic
Failure to Regulate Shale Gas Industry, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE (June 25, 2020, 1:52 PM),
https://www.post-gazette.com/news/environment/2020/06/25/Grand-jury-report-
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years of investigation, the report found that the Pennsylvania DEP failed to properly
regulate the practices surrounding fracking, thereby allowing the industry to harm
citizens and violate their constitutional right to clean air and water under the
Environmental Rights Amendment to the Pennsylvania Constitution.37 Attached to
the report is the DEP’s response, which rebukes most of the report’s findings and
introduces other potential culpable parties.38
1.

The Main Report

The grand jury report discussed the physical impact on Pennsylvania residents
exposed to polluted air and water from gas and fracking activities, sometimes
occurring as close as several hundred feet from families’ water supplies and homes.39
The resulting ailments from exposure to gases and drilling liquids involved severe
and sudden nosebleeds, headaches, and chronic rashes, with younger residents
experiencing troubling neurological problems more drastically than their adult
counterparts.40 Even more frightening, the long-term health effects of exposure to

Pennsylvania-systemic-failure-regulation-fracking-shale-gas-industry-oil-JoshShapiro/stories/202006250132 [https://perma.cc/795F-8YYR] (reporting on grand jury report’s
condemnation of Pennsylvania’s regulation of industry).
37. See id. (“There remains a profound gap between our constitutional mandate for clean air
and pure water, and the realities facing Pennsylvanians who live in the shadow of fracking giants
and their investors.”); see also PA. CONST. art. 1, § 27 (1971) (granting right to clean air and water).
The grand jury report also discusses the shortcomings of the Pennsylvania Department of Health
(DOH) in their response to the fracking boom. See PA. OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GEN., GRAND
JURY REPORT, supra note 5, at 7–8. The report describes a “hands off” approach that included “no
special training for public health center staff in affected communities; no public education alerting
people to the potential problem; [and] no centralized collection of data that might help pin down
what was making people feel sick.” Id. It also illustrated one of the ways DOH staff were told to
ignore fracking-related complaints: staff members were given a list of around twenty words that
related to fracking activity. See id. at 8. If a person called and used one of the terms, the staff
member was told to end the call, directing it instead to the central office where nothing would
happen. See id. (elucidating how Pennsylvania’s DOH rerouted and then ignored citizen complaints
using vocabulary related to fracking).
38. See PA. OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GEN., GRAND JURY REPORT, supra note 5, at 107
(claiming the DEP was surprised by “the extent of the factual inaccuracies and confused articulation
of the relevant law in the excerpts of the draft” when reading the grand jury report).
39. See id. at 13 (asserting close proximity between homes and industry activities “results in
unavoidable risks and problems”).
40. See id. at 39 (revealing children’s health effects from fracking activities were even more
severe than those of adults). While adults experienced “lethargy, bruising, intense cramping,
difficulty sleeping, and painful stomach problems, including nausea and vomiting,” the concerning
neurological problems exhibited by the children included frequent burning in the eyes, partial
blindness, “twitching and tremors, erratic and uncontrollable eye movements, and neuropathy,
which involves weakness, numbness, and stabbing or burning sensations throughout the body.”
Id.; see also PEGGY SLOTA, HYDRAULIC FRACTURING—“FRACKING”—AND CHILDREN’S
HEALTH,
MID-ATLANTIC
CTR.
FOR
CHILD.
HEALTH
&
ENV’T,
https://www.environmentalhealthproject.org/sites/default/files/assets/resources/frackingchildrens-health-6.6.18-pslota.pdf [https://perma.cc/G64T-7KCL] (last visited Sept. 24, 2020)
(explaining why children are more vulnerable to environmental hazards such as exposure to
pollution related to fracking). The process of fracking uses over one thousand different chemicals,
75% of which “affect skin, eyes, respiratory, and [gastrointestinal] systems,” approximately half of
which affect “the brain, nervous, immune, renal, and cardiovascular systems,” almost forty percent
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these pollutants is unknown, with parents and doctors worrying that children who
were exposed to fracking-related pollution could later face serious health
complications such as infertility and cancer.41
The grand jury report also highlighted the damage done to the citizen-state
relationship by sharing accounts of residents who lost faith in the agencies charged
with protecting them.42 One family, who suffered from nosebleeds, dizziness, and
rashes from industry activities, called the DEP only to be told that the Department
could not do anything to remedy the situation. 43 Although Attorney General
Shapiro did not bring any criminal charges against the DEP, he exposed potential
conflicts of interest in the common practice of the DEP employees being “lured
away” to work for the industry “they were supposed to be regulating.” 44
2.

The DEP’s Response

While the grand jury report reveals alarming failures of the state regulatory
agencies, even more unusual was the DEP’s response. 45 When the investigation
began, the DEP hired a criminal defense attorney “to represent at least one

of which “affect the endocrine system,” and a quarter of which “are carcinogens and mutagens.”
See SLOTA, supra (describing detrimental physiological impacts of potential toxins people are
exposed to near fracking sites).
41. See PA. OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GEN., GRAND JURY REPORT, supra note 5, at 40
(revealing doctors have advised children who suffered symptoms due to exposure to fracking
activities to “participate in regular cancer screening for decades to come”); see also Denise Meyer,
Fracking Linked to Cancer-Causing Chemicals, New Yale Study Finds, YALE SCH. MED. (Oct. 24, 2016),
https://medicine.yale.edu/news-article/13714/ [https://perma.cc/594C-LY9F] (explaining
medical study found “numerous carcinogens” used in fracking have “the potential to increase the
risk of childhood leukemia” while contaminating air and water in nearby communities).
42. See PA. OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GEN., GRAND JURY REPORT, supra note 5, at 52
(showing the DEP’s “insufficient and untimely” regulation of industry led to breakdown in public
trust between residents and government).
43. See id. (describing experience of a family in Washington County who reached out to the
DEP for help when industry activities began making them sick). The mother who reached out to
the DEP told Attorney General Shapiro: “I assumed by the title of their name, department of
environmental, I just thought they were protecting the environment . . . . Now I really don’t know
what they do.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). A resident of Bedford County, Pennsylvania,
whose complaints about contaminated water were not properly resolved, called the DEP the
“DGP—Department of Gas Protection—because that’s what they’re about.” Melissa A.
Troutman et al., “To Hell With Us”—Records of Misconduct Found Inside Pa. Drinking Water Investigations,
PUB. HERALD (Feb. 14, 2017), https://publicherald.org/to-hell-with-us-records-of-misconductfound-inside-pa-drinking-water-investigations/ [https://perma.cc/F5NV-CCPV] (Part 2 of
investigative report into oil and gas practices in Pennsylvania).
44. PA. OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GEN., GRAND JURY REPORT, supra note 5, at 100 (observing
revolving door between DEP and industry “they were supposed to be regulating” presented
concerning “staffing issue”). Attorney General Shapiro continues: “If DEP employees know there
may be a big paycheck waiting for them on an operator’s payroll, they may be reluctant, consciously
or otherwise, to bring to bear the full force of the law.” Id. (discussing how the “revolving door”
might affect the work of DEP employees). But see Michael Sanserino, Pennsylvania DEP Revising
Well-Plugging Regulations, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE (Mar. 3, 2014, 5:29 PM), https://www.postgazette.com/business/powersource/2014/03/03/pennsylvania-dep-revising-well-pluggingregulations/stories/201403030182 [https://perma.cc/TH9Z-739D] (reporting on the DEP’s
proactive revisions of well-plugging regulations).
45. See Phillips, supra note 35 (calling the DEP’s hiring of criminal defense attorneys
“possibly unprecedented”).
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employee.”46 Despite the DEP hiring a criminal defense attorney, criminal charges
never materialized against any employees. 47 The DEP submitted a response to the
grand jury report in which the agency cited its efforts to regulate a novel, rapidly
expanding industry.48 The DEP criticized the general assembly for not passing more
legislation during a time when the DEP was introducing new regulations of its own
through the Pennsylvania regulatory rulemaking process.49
The DEP described its regulatory response to the initial fracking boom, such
as restructuring its Oil and Gas Program, creating new offices with new staff, and
expanding its oversight in order to be more stringent even while federal agencies
were relaxing their policies on the industry.50 The DEP is subject to administrative
constraints, including orders coming from executive-level officials, the political lean
of current state and federal administrations, the laws being created by the legislative
branch, the limits of the regulatory rulemaking process, and the necessity of
balancing environmental interests with the economic and employment benefits of
the industry.51 The DEP disparaged the grand jury report for presenting an
“inaccurate and incomplete picture of Pennsylvania’s regulatory program” and its
implementation.52 The agency characterized the grand jury report as detrimental to
46. Id. (“Environmental attorney David Mandelbaum, co-chair of Greenberg Traurig’s
environmental practice who teaches environmental law at Temple University, said he knows of no
situations where a government employee doing a job like permit review, or issuing of permits,
would be charged with a crime short of bribery.”).
47. See id. (explaining the DEP’s actions in overseeing fracking industry were not criminal
and quoting David Mandelbaum that “the government is allowed to screw up”). While no criminal
charges were brought against any of the DEP employees, Attorney General Shapiro did bring
fifteen criminal charges against Cabot Oil and Gas and several environmental criminal charges
against Range Resources, the company who drilled the first Marcellus Shale well in Pennsylvania.
See Susan Phillips, Pa. Attorney General Charges Cabot Oil and Gas with Environmental Crimes, ST. IMPACT
PA (June 15, 2020), https://stateimpact.npr.org/pennsylvania/2020/06/15/pa-attorney-generalcharges-cabot-oil-and-gas-with-environmental-crimes/ [https://perma.cc/K3W2-CVUU]; see also
Reid Frazier, Range Resources Pleads No Contest to Environmental Crimes at Southwest Pa. Well Sites, ST.
IMPACT PA (June 12, 2020), https://stateimpact.npr.org/pennsylvania/2020/06/12/rangeresources-pleads-no-contest-to-environmental-crimes-at-southwest-pa-well-sites/
[https://perma.cc/ACP6-MAPD] (discussing criminal charges brought against oil and gas
companies in Pennsylvania for environmental crimes committed in relation to fracking activities).
48. See PA. OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GEN., GRAND JURY REPORT, supra note 5, at 104
(describing unconventional gas industry as posing a “unique challenge” for the DEP).
49. See id. at 109–10 (explaining the DEP’s efforts to regulate fracking industry through
regulatory rulemaking process, which is purposefully complicated in order to prevent agencies from
creating legislation).
50. See id. at 106 (listing programs the DEP introduced to oversee industry).
51. See id. at 139 (discussing limitations on the DEP’s ability to regulate industry); see also
Coral Davenport, E.P.A. Faces Bigger Tasks, Smaller Budgets and Louder Critics, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 18,
2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/19/us/politics/epa-faces-bigger-tasks-smallerbudgets-and-louder-critics.html [https://perma.cc/VA5T-STLP] (examining challenges federal
environmental agencies face, including attacks from “the political right,” “falling budgets,” and “its
very existence at stake”). Several comments from Republicans such as then-President Donald
Trump discussed effectively getting rid of the EPA “in almost every form” through policy
proposals that would take away the agency’s authority such that it would “end up functioning only
as a small scientific research agency, possibly swallowed into another department.” Id. (describing
planned political assault on environmental agency from Republican lawmakers).
52. See PA. OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GEN., GRAND JURY REPORT, supra note 5, at 108
(condemning grand jury report for relying on “unidentified witness snapshots” from over a decade
ago, and for “demonstrating little knowledge or understanding” of the DEP’s regulatory program).
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the public for damaging Pennsylvania citizens’ relationship with and confidence in
the DEP.53
B. Statutes for Environmental Enforcement
Most federal environmental statutes contain provisions for both civil and
criminal suits.54 In environmental law, the distinguishing factor that separates a civil
infraction from a criminal one is mental state. 55 An environmental felony occurs
when a violator acts knowingly, which “merely requires proof of knowledge of the
facts that constitute the offense” but not knowledge that the conduct was illegal.56
Additionally, perpetrators attempting to conceal or lie about environmental
infractions can violate several non-environmental criminal statutes at the state and
federal level.57

53. See id. at 152 (arguing grand jury report does “disservice” to public by encouraging them
“to believe their government is incompetent and/or places the economic well-being of various
corporations above their health and well-being and that of the Commonwealth’s public natural
resources”). Before Shapiro became the Pennsylvania Attorney General, reports had surfaced that
the DEP “used flawed methodology to conclude that air pollution from natural gas development
doesn’t cause health problems.” Lisa Song, Public Trust in Pennsylvania Regulators Erodes Further Over
Flawed
Fracking
Study,
INSIDE
CLIMATE
NEWS
(Oct.
23,
2014),
https://insideclimatenews.org/news/20141023/public-trust-pennsylvania-regulators-erodesfurther-over-flawed-fracking-study [https://perma.cc/TH9Z-739D]. A toxicologist from the
Southwest Pennsylvania Environmental Health Project claimed this was an unfixable severance of
public trust in addition to the “years of criticism” the DEP received “for its handling of the
Marcellus Shale boom.” Id. (demonstrating that, even back in 2014, the DEP had a strained
relationship with the public and breached its trust by mishandling fracking boom).
54. See AAGAARD, OWEN, & PIDOT, supra note 26, at 147 (demonstrating environmental
statutes contain provisions which allow for both civil and criminal enforcement actions).
55. See Uhlmann, Environmental Crimes, supra note 25, at 1242 (explaining “it is not unusual
that mental state requirements provide the primary distinction between criminal and civil liability,
especially for regulatory violations”). Uhlmann continues:
Because so much conduct is covered by the environmental laws, however, and the
government is not required to prove knowledge of the law, prosecutors have broad
discretion to determine what is criminal. Even when knowledge of the facts is present,
the government can elect between criminal, civil, and administrative remedies.
Id. Therefore, the same underlying actions could result in any of these options depending on the
violator’s mental state and prosecutorial discretion. See id. at 1242, 1225. For a further analysis of
why a prosecutor or agency would choose an administrative or civil option over criminal charges,
see supra note 27 and accompanying text.
56. Uhlmann, Environmental Crimes, supra note 25, at 1237 (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 184, 193 (1998)) (contrasting “knowing” with “willful”
standard, which requires “that the defendant acted with an evil meaning mind”). Having a knowing
standard for environmental crime encourages companies that engage in polluting activities to be
aware of environmental laws and regulations and dissuades ignorance of the law as an excuse to
legally pollute. See id. at 1239 (elucidating Congress’s motivations for amending mental state
requirement for environmental felonies). But see David E. Roth, Stephen R. Spivack, & Joseph G.
Block, The Criminalization of Negligence Under the Clean Water Act, 23 CRIM. JUST., no. 4, 2009, at 5,
https://www.bradley.com/-/media/files/insights/publications/2009/11/the-criminalization-ofnegligence-under-the-clea__/files/criminalization-of-negligence/fileattachment/criminalizationof-negligence.pdf [https://perma.cc/UT78-E8LS] (arguing criminalization of negligence under
CWA could lead to unfair prosecutions).
57. See Uhlmann, Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note 30, at 184 (describing prevalence of Title
18 Charges in environmental crimes, and denoting Title 18 as “the heart of the federal criminal
code” which includes “conspiracy, false statements, fraud, obstruction of justice, and perjury”).
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Environmental Criminal Provisions

The enforcement provision of the Clean Water Act (CWA) punishes negligent
violations with up to two years in prison and knowing violations with up to six years
in prison.58 Similarly, criminal penalties for negligent and knowing violations of the
Clean Air Act (CAA) include both potential fines and prison sentences. 59 The
Pennsylvania Solid Waste Management Act (SWMA) includes a section threatening
criminal penalties for “any person, other than a municipal official exercising his
official duties,” who violates the Act.60 Under both the CWA and SWMA, criminal
provisions can be violated through negligence. 61 Under the CWA and CAA, a
“person” includes responsible corporate officers, which means that corporate
officers can be charged if they know the violation is happening, have the authority
to stop it, and fail to do so.62
2.

Criminal Provisions Related to Environmental Crimes

Violators engaging in deceitful conduct in the course of environmental crimes
can face Title 18 charges.63 If an environmental crime involves lying to agency
employees about meeting standards, the offender could be charged for conspiracy
to commit an offense or to defraud the United States and face up to five years in
prison.64 Similarly, falsifying or concealing documents or making false statements
constitutes a crime punishable by varying prison sentences, depending on the issues

58. See 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c) (2018) (listing potential criminal penalties for negligent and
knowing violations of Clean Water Act).
59. See 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c)(2) (2018) (stating criminal penalties for violations of Clean Air
Act).
60. See Solid Waste Management Act, 35 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6018.606 (1980) (discussing
criminal penalties for violations of Act); see also id. § 6018.302 (describing disposal, processing, and
storage of residual waste).
61. See id. § 6018.606(f).
Any person who stores, transports, treats, or disposes of hazardous waste within the
Commonwealth in violation of section 401, or in violation of any order of the
department shall be guilty of a felony of the second degree and, upon conviction, shall
be sentenced to pay a fine of not less than $2,500 but not more than $100,000 per day
for each violation or to imprisonment for not less than two years but not more than ten
years, or both.
Id. (footnote omitted).
62. See Uhlmann, Environmental Crimes, supra note 25, at 1240–41 (“The doctrine imposes a
duty to act on responsible corporate officials, thereby eliminating the direct act requirement and
creating liability for a failure to act.”). Responsible corporate officers are those “who stand in a
responsible relationship to a violation” and “can be prosecuted for their failure to prevent the
violation.” Id. Uhlmann argues that the Responsible Corporate Officer doctrine aligns with the
environmental objectives of protecting citizens and deterring industry actors from polluting by
“ensuring that corporate officials with authority over environmental compliance cannot ignore
violations they know are occurring and have the ability to prevent.” Id. (finding Responsible
Corporate Officer doctrine helps to realize aims of environmental law).
63. See id. at 1248 (discussing how environmental criminals can also be charged under 18
U.S.C. for crimes such as fraud, false statements, and concealment).
64. See 18 U.S.C. § 371 (2018) (discussing crime of conspiracy to commit offense or to
defraud United States and its agencies).
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being obscured.65 Pennsylvania law also gives the Attorney General the power to
criminally prosecute “[s]tate officials or employees affecting the performance of
their public duties or the maintenance of the public trust . . . .”66
C. Case Law: Environmental Criminals and Government Misconduct
Government employees enjoy certain protections from civil lawsuits through
sovereign immunity and the Eleventh Amendment.67 Therefore, when a citizen is
harmed by the actions of a government official, sometimes the only satisfactory
recourse is criminal charges brought by federal or state prosecutors. 68 Furthermore,

65. See id. § 1001 (stating knowingly and willfully falsifying, concealing, or covering up
information, as well as making false statements or using false documents, can be punished with
fines and prison sentences).
66. See 71 PA. CONS. STAT. § 732-205(a)(1) (1980) (authorizing prosecution of officials who
violate public trust); see also THE WILDLIFE SOC’Y, THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE: IMPLICATIONS
FOR WILDLIFE MANAGEMENT AND CONSERVATION IN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA 9
(Sept.
2010),
https://wildlife.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/ptd_10-1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3S27-UVNK] (explaining importance of Public Trust Doctrine).
The Public Trust Doctrine (PTD), with its origin in Roman civil law, is an essential
element of North American wildlife law. The Doctrine establishes a trustee relationship
of government to hold and manage wildlife, fish, and waterways for the benefit of the
resources and the public. Fundamental to the concept is the notion that natural
resources are deemed universally important in the lives of people, and that the public
should have an opportunity to access these resources . . . .
THE WILDLIFE SOC’Y, supra.
67. See U.S. CONST. amend. XI (providing state employees with sovereign immunity); 1 PA.
CONS. STAT. § 2310 (1978) (amended 1998) (declaring that the Commonwealth’s “officials and
employees acting within the scope of their duties” enjoy sovereign immunity and official immunity);
see also Hope Babcok, The Effect of the United States Supreme Court’s Eleventh Amendment Jurisprudence on
Clean Water Act Citizen Suits: Muddied Waters, 83 OR. L. REV. 47, 105–06 (2004) (describing state’s
ability to “ignore federal environmental mandates largely without peril” due to the Eleventh
Amendment sovereign immunity). But see PennFuture Praises Philadelphia Court Decision as Victory for
Justice,
BUS.
WIRE
(Feb.
16,
2011,
5:02
PM),
https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20110216007089/en/PennFuture-PraisesPhiladelphia-Court-Decision-as-Victory-for-Justice
[https://perma.cc/2AM2-P76A]
(demonstrating the DEP employees can be sued in individual capacity when acting outside scope
of employment). This verdict, in which four of the DEP’s employees were held liable for $6.5
million in damages for pursuing violations against oil and gas companies, shows how private actions
against government officials can sometimes work in favor of polluters and against agency
employees trying to fulfill their duty to protect the public. See id. The United States District Court
in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania overturned the $6.5 million verdict, holding that the
employees were merely doing their jobs, thereby rectifying a potentially disastrous situation for
Pennsylvania residents. See id. (calling overturned verdict “a victory for justice”).
68. See AAGAARD, OWEN, & PIDOT, supra note 26, at 148 (discussing concept of forcing
government enforcement). While many environmental statutes contain citizen suit provisions
allowing private citizens to “step into the shoes of government enforcers” to “stop unlawful action”
and compel legally required actions, these provisions have two shortcomings when it comes to
redressing private harms. See id. First, citizens cannot use a citizen suit to force agencies to begin
enforcement proceedings against another entity, such as the oil and gas industry. See id. Second,
private citizens bringing these suits cannot recover compensatory or punitive damages, but merely
attorney’s fees. See id. at 144 (describing limitations on citizen suit provisions, including providing
notice to government beforehand and being barred from suing if government is already “‘diligently
prosecuting’ the same alleged violations”).
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oversight often occurs internally, either by senior officials in the same agency, and
in the case of the DEP, by the federal Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).69
1.

Individuals

Individuals facing criminal charges for environmental violations are often in
oversight positions and are charged for crimes of omission. 70 In the case of United
States v. Maury,71 employees at a pipeline were criminally charged for violating the
CWA and the CAA by failing to obtain the necessary permits and failing to report
and comply with emissions limitations.72 All of the charged employees were in
oversight positions, and both negligently and knowingly broke environmental laws
and federal laws for impeding investigations into those violations. 73 The defendants
received prison sentences varying from six to seventy months.74 In a similar case,
Commonwealth v. Farmer,75 both the M.W. Farmer Company and its president were
found guilty on eight counts for failing to obtain a permit and violating the SWMA.76
The company and its president were fined, and Mr. Farmer was sentenced to five
years of probation for violating Section 401(b) of the SWMA.77
Likewise, the president of an exercise equipment manufacturing corporation
was convicted by a jury for violating the SWMA in Downs v. Commonwealth.78 He was
charged with four criminal counts surrounding the improper storage, transportation,
69. See Enforcement Policy, Guidance, and Publications, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
https://www.epa.gov/enforcement/enforcement-policy-guidance-publications
[https://perma.cc/ES32-P7XC] (last visited Sept. 27, 2020) (providing the EPA’s enforcement
policies and documents); see also OFFICE OF OIL & GAS MGMT., DEP’T OF ENVTL. PROT.,
EXPEDITED ESCGP-2 PROCESS INTERNAL REVIEW 6 (2016) (presenting conclusions of internal
review); 25 SUMM. PA. JUR. 2D ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 9:111 (2d ed. 2021) (explaining that the
EPA’s oversight authority of state agencies stems from original delegation of power to states to
enact federal programs); Rosalie D. Morgan, What the Frack?: An Empirical Analysis of the Effect of
Regulation on Hydraulic Fracturing, 16 QUINNIPIAC HEALTH L.J. 77, 92 (2013) (expounding on issue
of fracking oversight).
70. See Uhlmann, Environmental Crimes, supra note 25, at 1232 (characterizing statutory
language used by Congress in creating environmental legislation as broad in order to cover most
pollution violations, such as “failure to obtain required permits” and the “failure to comply with”
recordkeeping requirements).
71. 695 F.3d 227, 233 (N.J. 2012) (finding pipeline employees in oversight positions
criminally liable for violating Clean Water Act and Clean Air Act).
72. See id. (explaining defendants’ positions as supervisors).
73. See id. at 246 (noting jury found company guilty of “felony violations of the CWA for the
1999 spill on the Delaware River and the unpermitted pumping of the cement pit” but high-ranking
employees guilty “only of negligent violations for those incidents.”) “All Defendants were
convicted of having knowingly and willfully engaged in a conspiracy . . . .” Id.
74. See id. (sentencing Prisque to seventy months, Faubert to forty-one months, Maury to
thirty months, and Davidson to six months in prison).
75. 750 A.2d 925, 926 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2000) (charging Farmer and M.W. Farmer Company
with criminal violations of the Solid Waste Management Act).
76. See id. at 927 (elucidating the nature of Farmer’s violations as “improperly dumping
contaminated soil” without proper permits).
77. See id. at 926 (“The trial court sentenced Michael Farmer to an aggregate period of five
years’ probation and payment of a fine of $18,000.”). The court ordered M.W. Farmer Company
to pay $67,000. All told, the defendants had to pay nearly $6 million to cover prosecution costs.
See id.
78. 616 A.2d 39, 42 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1992) (sentencing Vienna Health Products, Inc. and
its president and sole shareholder, Downs, for improperly disposing of hazardous wastes).

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2022

13

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 66, Iss. 6 [2022], Art. 2

30

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW: TOLLE LEGE

[Vol. 66

and disposal of hazardous wastes.79 In the case of United States v. Tonawanda Coke
Corp.,80 the Department of Justice brought criminal charges against Tonawanda
Coke Corporation for intentionally violating the CAA and RCRA. 81 The court
found that the defendants did not have to know their actions were illegal in order to
convict under the RCRA.82
2.

Government Officials and Misconduct

One of the EPA’s devices for oversight of state agency compliance and
enforcement program is the State Review Framework (SRF).83 The SRF report
allows the EPA to work with each state and its environmental agency to “identify
recommendations for improvement to ensure fair and consistent enforcement and
compliance programs across the states.” 84 The DEP also conducts internal reviews
in order to evaluate its own application of the rules and regulations. 85 But internal
and federal reviews become more questionable as oversight methods when

79. See id. (convicting Downs and punishing him with two to four years in prison, two years’
probation, $70,000 in fines, and 750 hours of community service).
80. 636 F. App’x 24, 26 (2d Cir. 2016) (finding corporation guilty of violating CAA and
RCRA despite defendant lacking notice that its actions were criminal). The court explains that the
“active management” condition in RCRA violations is a threshold requirement that, once met, can
result in a continuing storage violation. See id. at 29. In other words, once a manager has
accumulated or added to wastes, the act of storing them (or failing to dispose of them or to obtain
a storage permit) constitutes a violation. See id. (distinguishing between active management and
storage).
81. See id. at 26, 29–30; see also 2014 Major Criminal Cases, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
https://www.epa.gov/enforcement/2014-major-criminal-cases [https://perma.cc/QH7F-CP3T]
(last visited Mar. 17, 2021) (penalizing Tonawanda Coke Corp. with $12.5 million in fines and $12.2
million in community service for violating CAA and RCRA).
82. See Tonawanda Coke Corp., 636 F. App’x at 26 (reiterating Tonawanda Coke Corp.’s
contention that RCRA violations should be reserved because the corporation “lacked fair notice
that its conduct was criminal under RCRA”).
83. See
State
Review
Framework,
ENVTL.
PROT.
AGENCY,
https://www.epa.gov/compliance/state-review-framework [https://perma.cc/DG2S-V2S8] (last
visited Mar. 17, 2021) (describing State Review Framework Program and its reports); see also Candy
Woodall, Federal Regulators Find ‘Major Issues’ in DEP Review, PENNLIVE (Nov. 5, 2015),
https://www.pennlive.com/midstate/2015/11/federal_regulators_find_major.html
[https://perma.cc/YEC2-CXMW] (reviewing EPA’s 2009 evaluation of DEP, where EPA gave
agency score of zero percent in data accuracy and found issues with DEP’s oversight of Marcellus
Shale wells during fracking boom).
84. See State Review Framework, supra note 83 (describing how EPA uses State Review
Framework to enhance Compliance and Enforcement Program oversight); ENVTL. PROT.
AGENCY, STATE REVIEW FRAMEWORK: PENNSYLVANIA 1 (Aug. 2, 2017),
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2018-02/documents/srf-rd3-rev-pa.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7K4G-VPMV] (evaluating the DEP’s implementation and enforcement of
CWA, CAA, and RCRA in fiscal year 2015). Notably, the EPA’s Region 3 SRF for fiscal year 2015
praised the DEP’s Air Quality Program and the agency’s efforts in implementing efficient National
Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permitting programs. See id.; see also Troutman
et al., supra note 12 (discussing 2015 study by EPA asserting “fracking had no ‘widespread, systemic
impacts on drinking water supplies’”). The EPA’s report had to be retracted less than a year later
when “the EPA’s own Science Advisory Board (SAB) called them out” for not having any scientific
evidence to support their conclusions. Troutman et al., supra note 12.
85. See OFFICE OF OIL & GAS MGMT., supra note 69 (summarizing the report as an internal
review in order to evaluate the DEP’s own policies and recommend improvements).
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misconduct occurs at management and executive levels and the EPA emphasizes
partnership at the potential cost of an objective evaluation. 86
Despite the difficulties in prosecuting government employees, it is not unheard
of.87 A former FDA Commissioner, Lester Crawford, was subject to a federal grand
jury criminal investigation after financial records showed that he had “sold shares in
companies regulated by the agency when he was its deputy commissioner and acting
commissioner.”88 In the case In re Thirty-Third Statewide Investigating Grand Jury,89 the
attorney general launched a grand jury investigation against the Pennsylvania
Turnpike Commission for violating criminal statutes.90 The case’s holding—that
internal documents are not confidential when state agencies undergo
investigations—suggests the judicial branch favors uncovering criminal activity and
corruption over maintaining an agency’s legal protections against investigation.91
In relation to the grand jury report, the most applicable example of criminal
environmental prosecution against government officials occurred recently in the
Flint, Michigan water crisis.92 Government officials in Michigan “replaced safe
public water supplied to Flint from Lake Huron with improperly treated water
supplied from the polluted Flint River . . . despite evidence that the Flint River water
was unsafe.”93 This resulted in an entire city, comprised mostly of low-income and
minority groups, being “effectively poisoned.”94 In the wake of the Flint water crisis,
there was criticism of the government’s failure to take responsibility, even for

86. See State Review Framework, supra note 83 (stating EPA “works in partnership with each
state to create a final SRF,” which shows the DEP is heavily involved in their own compliance
evaluation).
87. See U.S. Attorney’s Office Middle Dist. of Pa., Public Corruption Prosecutions, U.S. DEP’T.
JUST.,
https://www.justice.gov/usao-mdpa/public-corruption-prosecutions
[https://perma.cc/8TW2-5JSC] (last updated Sept. 27, 2020) (informing public of recent public
corruption cases in Middle District of Pennsylvania); see also Norman Abrams, The Distance
Imperative: A Different Way of Thinking About Public Official Corruption Investigations/Prosecutions and the
Federal Role, 42 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 207, 207 (2011) (discussing how “cases involving the investigation
and prosecution of governmental corruption” create “concern about who should investigate and
prosecute the matter”).
88. See Gardiner Harris, Ex-Head of F.D.A. Faces Criminal Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 29, 2006),
https://www.nytimes.com/2006/04/29/washington/exhead-of-fda-faces-criminal-inquiry.html
[https://perma.cc/AY6Y-WXBR] (detailing case of Lester M. Crawford, who faced criminal
charges for conflict of interest crimes while leading FDA).
89. 86 A.3d 204, 226 (Pa. 2014) (finding attorney–client privilege and work product doctrine
do not preclude OAG’s access to documents requested for grand jury subpoenas).
90. See id. at 206 (describing statewide grand jury’s investigation into PA Turnpike
Commission’s “employment and procurement practices”).
91. See id. at 229 (“State agencies and their officials should be cognizant that communications
with counsel implicating criminal wrongdoing may be discoverable if the agency later becomes the
subject of a criminal grand jury investigation initiated by the OAG.”).
92. See Toni Massaro & Ellen Brooks, Flint of Outrage, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 155, 155–
157 (2017) (discussing the difficulty of bringing constitutional claims in face of egregious
government action).
93. Id. at 156 (footnotes omitted) (describing actions of government officials overseeing in
Flint, Michigan as “shocking”).
94. See id. at 192 (“Flint was an outrage of epic proportion. Human life, liberty, and property
were undeniably compromised by grossly irresponsible government acts. A whole city was
effectively poisoned because of official decisions made with knowledge of the water’s
contamination and its potential effects.”).
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calamities where culpability was evident.95 One commentator suggests redesigning
and expanding federal and state government’s role in order to “make them primarily
liable as regulated entities with respect to drinking water, as opposed to simply being
regulators and enforcers.”96 Despite the egregious, purposeful actions and serious
harm that occurred in Flint, Michigan, the criminal charges against the government
officials were recently dropped.97
D. Regulatory Capture and Environmental Agency Inaction
Issues in agency oversight—namely, the lack of objective supervision and
difficulty of holding government officials accountable—become even more pressing
when an agency is staffed by people with dubious intentions.98 Regulatory capture
can be defined as “the result or process by which regulation, in law or application,
through means induced by industry, is directed away from the public interest and
towards the interests of the regulated industry.”99 In addition to appointing two
men to executive-level positions who “have a history of hostility towards the agency
and deep ties to the fossil fuel industry,” the Trump administration attempted to
shift the EPA’s mission towards industry and away from public and environmental
health.100 As of July 15, 2020, the Trump administration rolled back almost seventy
95. See David A. Dana, Escaping the Abdication Trap When Cooperative Federalism Fails: Legal
Reform After Flint, 44 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1329, 1329 (2017) (arguing all levels of government
abdicated responsibility in Flint drinking water crisis); see also David Markell, “Slack” in the
Administrative State and its Implications for Governance: The Issue of Accountability, 84 OR. L. REV. 1, 17
(2005) (explaining how administrative state evades accountability).
96. Dana, supra note 95, at 1349 (suggesting that increasing liability for federal and state
governments in testing and safeguarding drinking water would improve their own regulation and
enforcement regimes). For a further discussion of expanding the government’s role and culpability
regarding issues such as contaminated water supply, see infra notes 184–92 and accompanying text.
97. See Mitch Smith, Flint Water Prosecutors Drop Criminal Charges, With Plans to Keep Investigating,
N.Y. TIMES (June 13, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/13/us/flint-water-crisischarges-dropped.html [https://perma.cc/K89B-7TJF] (discussing city’s shocked reaction when
prosecutors dropped all criminal charges against government officials “accused of ruining the
community’s drinking water and ignoring signs of a crisis”).
98. See Alex Guillén & Andrew Restuccia, Trump Picks Oil Ally Pruitt to Head EPA, POLITICO
(Dec.
7,
2016
5:17
PM),
https://www.politico.com/blogs/donald-trumpadministration/2016/12/oklahoma-ag-pruitt-epa-chief-232319 [https://perma.cc/B5KQ-9WSE]
(reporting then-President Donald Trump chose Scott Pruitt, one of EPA’s “most hostile critics and
a skeptic of climate change science” to lead EPA); see also Sarah Gibbens, 15 Ways the Trump
Administration Has Changed Environmental Policies, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC (Feb. 1, 2019),
https://www.nationalgeographic.com/environment/article/15-ways-trump-administrationimpacted-environment [https://perma.cc/Q3XN-6UDY] (demonstrating regulatory capture in
environmental law, especially when subject to administration adverse to environmental concerns,
can lead to lasting damage).
99. William C. Hudson, When Influence Encroaches: Statutory Advice in the Administrative State, 26
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 657, 669–71 (2018) (distinguishing regulatory capture from a “‘businessfriendly’ deregulatory President” who “appoints an industry-friendly administrator who makes
many regulatory decisions that benefit industry while harming the public interest” because industry
is not one shaping agency in latter case).
100. See Bryan Bowman, Captured: How the Fossil Fuel Industry Took Control of the EPA, GLOBE
POST (Mar. 12, 2019), https://theglobepost.com/2019/02/01/epa-regulatory-capture/
[https://perma.cc/996C-YC89] (quoting Trump as stating “he would destroy the EPA ‘in almost
every form,’ leaving ‘only tidbits’ intact”); see also Neela Banerjee, Trump’s EPA on the Verge of

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol66/iss6/2

16

Bernstein: Looking for a Lorax: Environmental Prosecution and Regulatory Fai

2021]

COMMENT

33

environmental regulations, with thirty more rollbacks pending.101 Despite the EPA’s
duty to protect citizens and the environment, when faced with budget cuts,
regulation rollbacks, and diminished authority, the public suffers the consequences
of a crippled agency.102
Regulatory capture is closely related to executive-led nonenforcement.103
Along with appointing leaders that will work against the mission of the agency,
presidents can also deregulate an industry through a nonenforcement agenda.104
This nonenforcement can be difficult to address due to requirements in the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA), which codifies the judicial review standards
for claims against agency actions.105 First, agency actions are not reviewable unless
they are final, an especially difficult standard to meet for a lack of action. 106 Second,

Regulatory
Capture,
Study
Says, INSIDE CLIMATE NEWS
(May
1,
2018),
https://insideclimatenews.org/news/01052018/trump-epa-regulatory-capture-industryinfluence-climate-pruitt-compared-reagan-gorsuch-journal-public-health
[https://perma.cc/3DMN-VXWK] (declaring Trump administration put EPA in danger of
regulatory capture).
101. See Nadja Popovich et al., The Trump Administration Is Reversing 100 Environmental Rules.
Here’s the Full List., N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/climate/trumpenvironment-rollbacks.html [https://perma.cc/7444-28PE] (last updated Jan. 20, 2021) (describing
how Trump administration rolled back regulations protecting clean air and water while Department
of the Interior limited wildlife protections in order to lease more land to oil and gas companies).
102. See Our Mission and What
We Do, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
https://www.epa.gov/aboutepa/our-mission-and-what-we-do [https://perma.cc/2SWN-TJTC]
(last visited Apr. 3, 2021) (stating EPA’s mission is to “protect human health and the
environment”); see also Popovich et al., supra note 101 (claiming Trump administration’s rollbacks
could exacerbate climate change and cause thousands of deaths due to poor air quality).
103. See Urska Velikonja, Accountability for Nonenforcement, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1549,
1555–56 (2018) (attributing Trump administration’s effect on environmental law to
nonenforcement).
104. See id. at 1552 (listing nonenforcement as preferred method of deregulation). Velikonja
explains why this option is favored:
The President, and by extension, agency heads, can achieve deregulatory objectives
through nonenforcement without significant delays and without any real threat of
judicial review, contrary to the very real roadblocks present in legislating and rulemaking.
This is because the Supreme Court afforded agencies considerable enforcement
discretion for piecemeal enforcement decisions. As long as a change in enforcement
policy is not prospective and categorical, it is immune from judicial review.
Id.
105. See Summary of the Administrative Procedure Act, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
https://www.epa.gov/laws-regulations/summary-administrative-procedure-act
[https://perma.cc/ZM3X-KR42] (last visited Apr. 4, 2021) (describing APA and how it applies to
federal agencies).
106. See Stephen Hylas, Final Agency Action in the Administrative Procedure Act, 92 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1644, 1650 (2017) (explaining different types of agency action). Congress defines agency
action as “the whole or a part of an agency rule, order, license, sanction relief, or the equivalent of
denial thereof, or failure to act.” 5 U.S.C. § 551(13) (2018). However, agency actions need to be
final in order to be reviewable, and thus including “failure to act” in the definition of agency action
has not allowed otherwise reviewable cases to come forth. See Hylas, supra, at 1675. For example,
one death row case involved inmates challenging an agency’s failure to approve a safe and effective
drug for lethal injections. See id. at 1657 n.82. The court found this argument “presumptively
unreviewable and ‘committed to agency discretion by law’ because there was ‘no law to apply.’” Id.
(quoting Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 826 (1985)). Therefore, this inclusion of “failure to act”
in the context of agency actions that must be final only leads to claims that are “presumptively
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there is a presumption that agency nonenforcement is unreviewable, and therefore
“[c]ourts routinely dismiss actions challenging agencies’ failures to enforce.” 107
Lastly, the finality requirement remains in place even when statutes explicitly require
direct judicial review of agency action without any reference to finality. 108
Parties have found some ways around these obstacles.109 For example, in
Massachusetts v. EPA,110 several private organizations forced a final action by
petitioning the EPA to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from vehicles under the
CAA.111 Another way to circumvent the APA’s finality requirement and sue for
inaction is by bringing tort or constitutional claims as demonstrated by Juliana v.
United States.112 Although the claim in Juliana was for violating due process and the
unreviewable.” See id. (explaining why current definition of agency action and requirement of
finality leads to inability to pursue claims of inaction); see also § 704 (allowing judicial review only
for “[a]gency action made reviewable by statute and final agency action for which there is no other
adequate remedy in a court” and for “preliminary, procedural, or intermediate agency action or
ruling not directly reviewable” but reviewable “on the review of the final agency action”); Sidney
Shapiro, Rulemaking Inaction and the Failure of Administrative Law, 68 DUKE L.J. 1805, 1808 (2019)
(discussing how agency inaction is accepted by courts because of agency deference and lack of a
rulemaking record available when no actions are taken).
107. Velikonja, supra note 103, at 1553–54 (characterizing Heckler v. Chaney as “the bestknown Supreme Court decision on nonenforcement”); see also Shapiro, supra note 106, at 1808
(arguing “abject deference” courts give agency decisions leads to acceptance of inaction). The
Supreme Court in Heckler v. Chaney ruled “an agency’s decision not to take enforcement action
should be presumed immune from judicial review under § 701(a)(2).” Velikonja, supra note 103, at
1554 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Heckler, 470 U.S. at 832).
108. See Roberto Borgert, What About Bell? Overcoming the Presumption in Favor of Requiring
Finality in the CWA’s Direct-Review Provision, 85 U. CHI. L. REV. 145, 151 (2018) (“The Supreme Court
has recognized a ‘strong presumption [ ] that judicial review will be available only when agency
action be- comes final,’ even if the direct-review statute does not mention finality. The presumption
has never been overcome.” (alteration in original) (quoting Bell v. New Jersey, 461 U.S. 773, 778
(1982))).
109. See Hylas, supra note 106, at 1675 (exploring potential solutions to problem of agencies
avoiding judicial review through temporary and non-binding actions). Hylas discusses Section
706(1) of the APA, which allows courts to “‘compel agency action unlawfully withheld or
unreasonably delayed’ before actions are final.” Id. (quoting § 706(1)). The Supreme Court
narrowly construed this authority so courts “can only compel agencies to take action under Section
706(1) when the agency fails to take discrete action that it is statutorily required to take.” Id.
(examining Section 706(1)’s reasonable delay provision as a way to skirt final action requirement).
Cf. 2 PUB. NAT. RESOURCES L. § 17:14 (2d ed. 2020) (discussing how use of statutorily-mandated
duties to act can give petitioner better claim of agency inaction).
110. 549 U.S. 497, 504–05 (2007) (challenging EPA’s final action of refusing to regulate
greenhouse gas emissions, including carbon dioxide).
111. See id. at 531–32 (exploring EPA’s argument that it could not regulate motor vehicle
carbon dioxide emissions “because doing so would require it to tighten mileage standards,” which
is DOT’s job). The EPA denied the petition in an official written document. See id. at 510.
Therefore, the plaintiffs were not suing the EPA for failing to act, but on the “final action” of their
written denial to regulate the emissions. See id. at 514 n.16 (describing limitations on bringing
petition for review of agency’s final action).
112. 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224, 1246 (D. Or. 2016) (describing case as civil rights action charging
government with “failure to act in areas where they have authority to do so”), rev’d and remanded by
947 F.3d 1159 (9th Cir. 2020). In this case, a group of young people sued the United States,
President Barack Obama, and several executive agencies for violating due process and the public
trust by permitting and encouraging pollution that exacerbated climate change. See id. After the
plaintiffs received a favorable ruling in the U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon, the Ninth
Circuit held in 2020:
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public trust, private citizens were essentially able to sue government officials for
failing to enact more stringent regulations to prevent climate change without
confronting the APA’s finality requirements.113 In theory, parties can also avoid the
finality requirement while still bringing a case under the APA as long as the claim
falls under a direct-review provision within an applicable statute.114
Despite these potential workarounds, limiting judicial review of agency
inaction makes nonenforcement an easy route to avoid accountability. 115 Parties
who cannot organize a petition and get a definitive response from agencies will not
meet the finality requirement.116 Furthermore, there is currently no right to clean
and safe air, water, or an environment under the Constitution, so constitutional

The plaintiffs have made a compelling case that action is needed; it will be increasingly
difficult in light of that record for the political branches to deny that climate change is
occurring, that the government has had a role in causing it, and that our elected officials
have a moral responsibility to seek solutions. We do not dispute that the broad judicial
relief the plaintiffs seek could well goad the political branches into action. We reluctantly
conclude, however, that the plaintiffs’ case must be made to the political branches or to
the electorate at large, the latter of which can change the composition of the political
branches through the ballot box. That the other branches may have abdicated their
responsibility to remediate the problem does not confer on Article III courts, no matter
how well-intentioned, the ability to step into their shoes.
Juliana v. United States, 947 F.3d 1159, 1175 (9th Cir. 2020) (citation omitted) (finding plaintiffs
lacked standing to bring suit against government but suggesting plaintiffs could “goad” legislative
and executive branches into action).
113. See Juliana, 947 F.3d at 1175 (acknowledging government’s failure to act exacerbated
climate change, thereby harming the plaintiffs).
114. See Borgert, supra note 108, at 155 (“The ‘final’ modifier in § 704 applies to agency action
with no other remedy in court, not ‘agency action made reviewable by statute.’ That is, a party may
bring a claim under the APA to challenge a nonfinal action directly reviewable under another
statute. Recent Supreme Court decisions agree with this reading.” (footnote omitted) (quoting
Iowa League of Cities v. EPA, 711 F.3d 844, 863 n.12 (8th Cir. 2013))). Despite this possible
method of circumventing finality, courts have frequently presumed finality in direct-review
provisions even when it is left out of the statute. See id. at 149–50.
115. See Daniel E. Walters, The Judicial Role in Constraining Presidential Nonenforcement Discretion:
The Virtues of an APA Approach, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1911, 1912–13 (2016) (identifying lack of
transparency and accountability as two of the problems with the trend of executive-led
nonenforcement); see also Maria E. Heckel, Finding the Line Between Action and Inaction: SUWA v.
Norton and Judicial Review of Statutory Land Management Standards, 2004 UTAH L. REV. 789, 825
(asserting “limits on judicial review of agency inaction under a statutory standard would mean that
judicial review of this issue would never be available unless the agency chose to codify its decision
not to meet that standard”).
116. Some commentators suggest the line between action and inaction is indistinct, and
agency inaction claims can be avoided by reframing the inaction as an action. See Eric Biber, Two
Sides of the Same Coin: Judicial Review of Administrative Agency Action and Inaction, 26 VA. ENVTL. L.J.
461, 461–62 (2008) (arguing there is no fundamental distinction between agency action and
inaction); see also Walters, supra note 115, at 1929 (suggesting plaintiffs “increase their chances of
review by characterizing prospective nonenforcement decisions as affirmative rules or policies,
which is often quite easy to do”). But the finality requirement makes it difficult to characterize lack
of action as an action, as demonstrated by the current test for finality: “First, the action must mark
the consummation of the agency’s decisionmaking process—it must not be of a merely tentative
or interlocutory nature. And second, the action must be one by which rights or obligations have
been determined, or from which legal consequences will flow.” William D. Araiza, In Praise of a
Skeletal APA: Judicial Discretion, Remedies for Agency Inaction and APA Amendment, 56 ADMIN. L. REV.
979, 986 (2004) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 177–
78 (1997)).
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claims are extremely hard to bring.117 Lastly, as mentioned, courts have been
reluctant to interpret direct-review provisions as allowing judicial review of nonfinal
actions even when they do not mention a finality requirement. 118 These challenges
make viable inaction claims difficult to bring.119
III. “I SPEAK FOR THE [PERMITEES]”120: AN ANALYSIS OF REGULATORY
NEGLIGENCE AND INDUSTRY PREFERENCE OVER PUBLIC PROTECTION
A similar problem exists when addressing regulatory capture of the EPA or the
DEP’s response to fracking: the system both protects and supports agencies’ failure
to act.121 The mental state requirements for environmental crimes—negligence and
knowledge of the underlying facts—demonstrate that inaction is criminally
punishable under environmental law.122 Additionally, the case law shows that those
charged with environmental crimes often committed crimes of omission by failing
to report and dispose of wastes and pollutants properly. 123 Comparably, the grand

117. See Emily Parsons, The Substantial Impact Approach: Reviewing Policy Statements in Light of
APA Finality, 95 WASH. L. REV. 495, 525 (2020) (describing challenge of bringing viable claims
avoiding the APA’s requirements, such as a constitutional claim, when faced with non-binding
agency actions like guidance documents and policy statements that cannot otherwise be challenged).
118. See Borgert, supra note 108, at 156, 157–58 (recognizing “courts have been unwilling to
recognize that some statutes authorize review for nonfinal actions”). Borgert contrasts the Clean
Air Act’s direct-review provision with that of the Clean Water Act. See id. Even though the former
mentions a finality requirement and the latter does not, the circuits have split over whether finality
is implied, even when it is not mentioned in a direct-review provision. See id. at 158.
119. See Heckel, supra note 115, at 801 (stating that cases of agency inaction create “a
conundrum for the courts”).
120. See SEUSS, supra note 2, at 28. The original quote is “I speak for the trees.” Id.
121. See Massaro & Brooks, supra note 92, at 155 (arguing current regulatory regime could
be modified to “provide space for the development of a potential fundamental right to
uncontaminated water while allowing public airing of the serious harms to life”); see also Kristina
Marusic, Fractured: Distrustful of Frackers, Abandoned by Regulators, ENVTL. HEALTH NEWS (Mar. 1,
2021),
https://www.ehn.org/fractured-fracking-regulation-neglect-2650594611.html
[https://perma.cc/6THY-QHKR] (listing ways current regulatory system failed Pennsylvania
residents). The system’s failures include “failing to adequately regulate the industry at its outset,
failing to adequately train employees to respond to complaints, failing to adequately test for safety,
and failing to notify residents about problems that could impact their health in a timely manner.”
Marusic, supra. The system also keeps open a “‘revolving door’ between industry and the
department” that drained talent and cast doubt on the Department’s integrity. See id.
122. See Uhlmann, Environmental Crimes, supra note 25, at 1240 (recounting rationale of
Supreme Court regarding Responsible Corporate Officer doctrine). The Supreme Court explained
it is permissible to hold a business official responsible for failing to “exercise the authority and
supervisory responsibility reposed in them by the business organization” if it resulted in a violation
because the law “imposes not only a positive duty to seek out and remedy violations when they
occur but also, and primarily, a duty to implement measures that will insure that violations will not
occur.” Id. (second internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658,
671–72 (1975)).
123. See, e.g., United States v. Tonawanda Coke Corp., 636 F. App’x. 24, 26 (2d Cir. 2016)
(holding administration of Coke was culpable for improper storage of hazardous waste); United
States v. Maury, 695 F.3d 227, 233 (3d Cir. 2012) (finding defendants guilty of improper waste
disposal and knowingly disguising the wrongdoing); Commonwealth v. Farmer, 750 A.2d 925, 926
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 2000) (ruling company liable for improper disposal of waste); Downs v.
Commonwealth, 616 A.2d 39, 41 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1992) (holding defendants responsible for
improper management of hazardous waste).
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jury report describes numerous instances where the agency’s negligent and knowing
lack of action in regulating fracking led to injury to citizens and their property. 124
A. Standards for Statutory Environmental Enforcement
The fact that some environmental statutes merely require negligence for a
criminal charge demonstrates that, when it comes to environmental crimes, failing
to act is sometimes the same as, or even worse than, actively polluting. 125 Pollution
is the result of industry activities, and industry actors who fail to minimize, control,
or regulate pollution can receive sizeable fines and prison sentences. 126 Even
knowing violations, whether they breach environmental criminal provisions or
criminal statutes related to environmental crimes, involve knowing of a certain
environmentally adverse situation and failing to act appropriately in response.127
Therefore, when enforcing environmental statutes, agencies and prosecutors hold
individuals criminally accountable for careless inaction—a standard that is not
similarly applied to the government agencies regulating these industries.128
1.

Environmental Criminal Provisions

Under the CWA and the CAA, unintentional pollution can result in criminal
penalties for negligent discharges and negligent endangerment. 129 Some attorneys
have described the criminalization of negligence for environmental violations as a
“systemic transformation” that is “profoundly unfair.” 130 While their expressed
concern is for the “countless numbers of construction workers and contractors”
being exposed to “heightened criminal liability for using ordinary devices to engage
in normal industrial operations,” the case law demonstrates those typically punished
are in executive positions of companies acting outside of normal industrial
operations.131 The criminalization of negligence in certain environmental statutes is
124. See PA. OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GEN., GRAND JURY REPORT, supra note 5, at 67
(describing the DEP’s actions in supporting fracking industry as combination of both “[a] deliberate
policy decision” and “inadequate supervision”).
125. See Uhlmann, Environmental Crimes, supra note 25, at 1236. “Although characterized as
an issue of statutory construction, the question in cases addressing the mental state requirements
for environmental crime was whether the government was required to prove knowledge of the
law.” Id.
126. See Uhlmann, Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note 30, at 179–81 (detailing how significant
environmental harm, public health effects, deceptive or misleading conduct, operating outside the
regulatory system, and repetitive violations determine severity of violation).
127. See id. at 180 (attributing failure to renew permits, monitor, report, and maintain records
as characteristics of actors who are criminally prosecuted for environmental crimes).
128. See Dana, supra note 95, at 1330 (identifying extensive issue of government abdication
of responsibility in wake of environmental crises).
129. See Uhlmann, Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note 30, at 171 (discussing CWA’s and CAA’s
authorization of criminal prosecution in response to accidental pollution).
130. See Roth, Spivack, & Block, supra note 56, at 5 (expressing fears over seriously
considering public welfare in environmental crimes: “To conclude that all statutes ‘protecting the
environment’ are public welfare statutes would, in one fell swoop, allow imposition of strict liability
for all environmental offenses”).
131. Id. at 1 (quoting Hanousek v. United States, 585 U.S. 860, 861 (2000) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting from denial of petition for writ of certiorari)). While businesses deserve clarity in the
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not meant to punish the industries they regulate, but is rather a recognition that
negligence relating to pollution and hazardous substances can lead to serious
consequences for people and the environment, including major environmental
disruptions, illness, and death.132
2.

Criminal Statutes Related to Environmental Crimes

Most criminal statutes related to environmental violations, such as conspiracy
and false statements, require knowing violations due to the nature of the crime. 133
For example, a perpetrator must have knowledge of the underlying offense in order
to conspire to commit or obscure the offense.134 Similarly, falsifying and concealing
documents requires knowledge of the original information and a willful intent to
alter them.135 In fact, the mental state standards for many of these offenses exceed
the “knowledge” requirement of environmental laws that merely involves
knowledge of the underlying facts.136
B. Standards for Individual Enforcement
In most environmental prosecutions, companies and corporate executives
responsible for employee activity are charged with both negligent and knowing
crimes.137 In comparison, only overt and egregious misconduct by government
officials is met with charges.138 Even then, charges can be dropped in severe cases
such as the Flint, Michigan water crisis, leaving little to no recourse for innocent

laws and regulations they must operate under, once the law is apparent—ensuring a company and
its operators can face criminal prosecution for certain negligent violations—the importance of
public health should be recognized in monitoring these industries whose byproducts are lethal to
people and the environment. See Uhlmann, Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note 30, at 179 (identifying
environmental harm or public health effects as an important factor in determining the severity of
environmental violations).
132. See Uhlmann, Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note 30, at 168 (“Congress provided enhanced
penalties for environmental violations that placed others in imminent danger of death or serious
bodily injury.”).
133. See 18 U.S.C. § 371 (2018) (describing crime of conspiracy to commit offense or to
defraud United States); § 1001 (enumerating ways statements or entries can be falsified and
concealed that could result in criminal charge).
134. See § 371 (codifying conspiracy as federal crime).
135. See § 1001 (stating explicitly a person must “knowingly and willfully” falsify or conceal
documents, even though concept of falsification implies knowledge on part of perpetrator).
136. See id. (including willful in the mens rea requirements for falsifying information although
most environmental statutes require negligence or knowledge, illustrating fact that environmental
crimes hinge on inaction more than others); see also Uhlmann, Environmental Crimes, supra note 25, at
1235 (explaining Congress removed willfulness requirement from CWA in favor of knowledge
standard).
137. See U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Prosecution of Federal Pollution Crimes, ENV’T & NAT. RESOURCES
DIVISION (May 13, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/enrd/prosecution-federal-pollution-crimes
[https://perma.cc/UT5F-PRRH] (listing federal pollution cases where companies and owners
directing employee behavior were held criminally liable for environmental violations). For
examples of case law illustrating executive liability for knowing or negligent conduct, see cases cited
supra note 123.
138. See Harris, supra note 88 (describing case of Lester Crawford, who had personal,
financial interests in companies he was in charge of regulating as head of the FDA).
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citizens seriously harmed by government agency action ranging from negligent to
overtly criminal.139
1.

Individuals

In United States v. Maury, the court discussed the case United States v. Hanousek,140
which had held that “the appropriate mens rea . . . was simple, rather than gross,
negligence,” under the criminal provision of the CWA for a railroad company
polluting navigable waters with oil.141 The court examined the legislative intent
behind the CWA, categorizing it as “a form of public welfare legislation” which
allows the CWA “to ‘render criminal “a type of conduct that a reasonable person
should know . . . may seriously threaten the community’s health or safety.”’”142 Due
to Congress’s objective of protecting public welfare and its lack of explicit language
in the criminal provision of this statute, the court in Maury and courts in other
circuits have reasoned the mens rea for a CWA misdemeanor violation is simple
negligence, as opposed to gross negligence. 143
In Commonwealth v. Farmer, the court discussed its consistent holding “that
certain strict liability or absolute liability criminal enactments are constitutional,”
including the strict liability standard in the criminal provisions of the SWMA.144
Despite reiterating its support for the SWMA’s negligence standard, the court also
emphasized Farmer’s profession as a petroleum engineer, which gave him expert
knowledge of hazardous waste.145 The court mentioned Farmer’s acknowledgment
that the industry is “highly regulated.”146 This inclusion implies that, even though
the SWMA can apply to negligent actions, Farmer was even more culpable due to
his knowledge and expertise of both the industry’s regulation standards and of the
hazardous waste products themselves.147 By this logic, an agency such as the DEP,
139. See Smith, supra note 97 (stating decision to drop charges against officials responsible
for Flint water crisis “stunned the city of Flint, Mich[igan]”).
140. 176 F.3d 1116, 1120 (9th Cir. 1999) (detailing jury conviction stemming from negligent
discharge of oil into navigable waters).
141. See Maury, 695 F.3d at 257 (citing Hanousek, 176 F.3d at 1121) (discussing past precedent
in order to determine correct mens rea under Clean Water Act).
142. Id. (quoting Hanousek, 176 F.3d at 1121).
143. See id. at 257–58 (explaining Congress explicitly expressed intent in statutory text when
intending gross negligence standard and lack of such language indicates Congress meant simple
rather than gross negligence); see also Uhlmann, Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note 30, at 169 (stating
that, while most criminal violations of environmental statutes require knowing violations, accidental
pollution under CWA and CAA can generate criminal prosecution through negligent discharges
and negligent endangerment).
144. Commonwealth v. Farmer, 750 A.2d 925, 929–30 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2000) (citing past
precedent that ruled SWMA’s strict liability standard for transferring and dumping hazardous waste
did not violate due process).
145. See id. at 929 (“Michael Farmer is a petroleum engineer who realizes that petroleum
products have a low flash point. Farmer asserts, however, that mixing products together and
shipping them off for recycling should not be interpreted as handling a hazardous waste.”).
146. See id. (“Farmer acknowledges that it is involved in a highly regulated industry and that
Section 401(b) of the SWMA clearly subjects persons who store, transport, treat or dispose of waste
to liability for harm even though they have exercised the utmost care.”).
147. See id. (discussing void for vagueness doctrine as holding statute unconstitutional if it
“fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that contemplated conduct is forbidden”
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which has expertise in both environmental science and environmental regulations,
would be that much more culpable for negligent or knowing inadequacies in their
oversight of the fracking industry.148
In Downs v. Commonwealth, the court found that Downs was criminally negligent
because he should have known his cost-saving method of waste disposal was unsafe
and created a “substantial risk.”149 In response to the argument that he could not
be held responsible for his employees’ actions, the court replied that he was being
held accountable for his own negligent actions. 150 The court reasoned that,
considering Downs’s actions could significantly harm people and the environment,
a prison sentence of two to four years was not disproportionate for the offense. 151
Similarly, the Tonawanda court held the company liable for environmental violations
resulting in $12.2 million in damages, which were used to evaluate “the effects of its
conduct on human health and the environment.”152 These cases demonstrate that
substantial risks to public health and citizen fears over potential harms can justify
hefty fines and even prison sentences for mere negligence in environmental criminal
law.153
2.

Government Officials

In the EPA’s State Review Framework report, it summarized the DEP’s area
for improvement as updating penalty calculations in their National Pollutant
Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) wastewater and stormwater programs. 154
Despite almost five trillion cubic feet of natural gas produced in Pennsylvania in
2015, the SRF evaluation does not mention the adverse effects of fracking in relation
to the NPDES, the CWA, or the CAA. 155 In fact, the oversight program meant to
immediately after mentioning that petroleum engineer Farmer understood intricacies of hazardous
wastes (emphasis added)).
148. See id. (emphasizing Farmer’s expertise as a factor in deciding his level of culpability).
149. See Downs v. Commonwealth, 616 A.2d 39, 464 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1992) (finding that
defendant’s policy of “permitting employees to remove waste from the plant to save the cost of
otherwise disposing of it” was clearly risky).
150. See id. at 466 (claiming Downs was charged for crimes he himself was personally
responsible for).
151. See id. at 467 (stating Downs received lenient sentence considering potential penalties
under SWMA).
152. United States v. Tonawanda Coke Corp., 636 F. App’x. 24, 29 (2d Cir. 2016) (finding
Tonawanda Coke Corp.’s activities “caused harm to those members of the public who are
reasonably concerned that their property or their health has been compromised by the effects of
TCC’s illegality”).
153. See id. at 30 (discussing defendant’s fine to be used for a study to benefit potentially
afflicted community); see also Downs, 616 A.2d at 467 (considering proportionality of sentence in
relation to potential and actual harm caused to citizens).
154. See State Review Framework, supra note 83 (providing results of State Review Framework
reports by state).
155. See id. (evaluating the DEP’s 2015 FY performance but neglecting to mention issues
surrounding regulation of industry’s fracking technique); see also DEP’T ENVTL. PROT., 2015 OIL
AND
GAS
ANNUAL
REPORT
6–31
(2015),
http://www.depgreenport.state.pa.us/elibrary/GetDocument?docId=6318&DocName=2015%2
0OIL%20AND%20GAS%20ANNUAL%20REPORT.PDF%20%20%3Cspan%20style%3D%2
2color%3Agreen%3B%22%3E%3C%2Fspan%3E%20%3Cspan%20style%3D%22color%3Ablu
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ensure the DEP is implementing and enforcing regulations in line with the statutes
mentioned above, does not mention fracking at all.156 As In re Thirty-Third Statewide
Investigating Grand Jury and the charges brought against Lester Crawford show, when
there is proper oversight and government misconduct is investigated and brought to
light, the executive and judicial branches favor uncovering and disciplining such
misconduct.157
In response to the dropping of charges against state officials, one Flint resident
expressed dismay: “This is not justice . . . . The only thing it tells me is our lives
don’t matter.”158 The lawsuits brought against government actors in Flint included
claims of substantive due process and equal protection rights violations. 159 Plaintiffs
were forced to allege “ostensibly more restricted liberties” such as “a right to bodily
integrity and a right to freedom from third-party harms” because the Supreme Court
“has consistently refused to constitutionalize affirmative rights to basic human
needs.”160 Without a solid legislative claim to bring forward, plaintiffs harmed by
the Flint water crisis were unable to receive injunctive or economic relief for the
government’s “outrageous . . . man-made disaster that could have been avoided with
a minimum of foresight and at relatively little expense.”161 The Flint water crisis sets
a dangerous precedent in environmental law: government officials and agency
employees can be the direct cause of poisoning citizens yet face no serious legal
repercussions.162

e%3B%22%3E%3C%2Fspan%3E [https://perma.cc/XK3Z-G9VR] (summarizing Pipeline
Infrastructure Task Force’s actions throughout year, including data trends and expectations from
the DEP).
156. See State Review Framework, supra note 83 at 1 (describing the DEP’s Air Quality Program
as “thorough and comprehensive” and its RCRA program inspection reports as “well-written and
organized”).
157. See In re Thirty-Third Statewide Investigating Grand Jury, 86 A.3d 204, 226 (Pa. 2014)
(favoring ability to root out official misconduct over government confidentiality when proper
oversight allows such misconduct to be discovered); see also Harris, supra note 88 (reporting on
charges brought against ex-head of the FDA, Lester Crawford).
158. Smith, supra note 97 (internal quotation marks omitted) (relaying one resident’s view
that dropped charges against state officials for “a failure of government at all levels” seem “like a
political ploy”). These comments made by Flint residents are very similar to the ones made by
Pennsylvania citizens in regard to the fracking industry, depicting feelings of hopelessness and
distrust in the face of government failures to adequately protect them. See PA. OFFICE OF
ATTORNEY GEN., GRAND JURY REPORT, supra note 5, at 52 (sharing story of family who called
the DEP for help, only to be told agency could do nothing to assist them); see also Troutman et al.,
supra note 12 (reporting on resident who felt the DEP was more likely to protect gas and oil interests
rather than PA citizens and environment).
159. See Massaro & Brooks, supra note 92, at 157, 158 (enumerating basis of the actions
plaintiffs brought against Flint officials).
160. Id. at 158 (describing “narrower claims” plaintiffs were forced to bring as “quaky,”
“fragile,” and difficult to satisfy due to lack of legislation or precedent affirming constitutional right
to basic necessities, such as food and clean water).
161. Id. (“Not all outrageous government acts violate the Constitution, but the ones at stake
in the Flint crisis did.”).
162. See id. at 156 (tracing contamination of Flint’s water directly to both negligent and
intentional actions of government officials).
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C. The DEP’s Policies: Negligence and Knowledge
An overarching theme of the grand jury report’s criticisms of the DEP and its
response to the fracking boom is the department’s failure to act.163 These criticisms
involve situations where it seems that there were both negligent and knowing
violations of the DEP’s mission and its own practices. 164 Despite the intentions or
mental state behind each policy decision, Attorney General Shapiro emphasized that
citizens of Pennsylvania were the ones who felt the consequences. 165
1.

Negligence

The grand jury report concluded by clarifying that the DEP’s failure to protect
Pennsylvania residents and the environment “may not have been intentional or
malicious.”166 Notwithstanding the lack of malintent, the report considered multiple
instances of employee negligence in their oversight of the oil and gas industry. 167
The report described how the DEP’s reliance on inaccurate water testing methods
led to confusion over whether fracking caused contamination. 168 It also examined
how the DEP sometimes either did not answer or dismissed complaints by residents
who had hired their own environmental experts. 169
Attorney General Shapiro pointed out that the challenges the DEP faced from
the industry and the fracking boom was “not the fault of Department employees”
and that grand jury “believe[s] that many DEP employees were doing the best job
possible with the limited resources they had.” 170 For example, when the code used
for water testing was updated, numerous employees continued using the outdated

163. See PA. OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GEN., GRAND JURY REPORT, supra note 5, at 49, 53,
54, 55, 58, 60, 62, 64, 65 (breaking down review of the DEP’s response to regulating industry into
sections titled: “failure to regulate,” “failure to train,” “failure to communicate,” “failure to test,”
“failure to inspect,” “failure to notify,” “failure to issue violations,” “failure to refer,” and “failure
to listen”).
164. See id. at 67 (attributing the DEP’s inadequate response to fracking as both a “deliberate
policy decision” and also one of “inadequate supervision,” implying both willful and inadvertent
actions).
165. See id. (“However, policy decisions also have consequences, and in this case, one
consequence of the decisions made by multiple administrations and DEP was inadequate
supervision of an industry which had—and continues to have—significant impacts on the
Commonwealth’s citizens.”).
166. Id. (describing DEP’s failure to “meet its mission” in protecting Pennsylvania’s natural
resources and its citizens as potentially not malicious or intentional).
167. See id. at 65–66 (outlining instances where the DEP failed to listen to citizens
complaining about water contamination and pollution although citizens had video evidence or
analyses of environmental consultants).
168. See id. at 6 (contending the DEP’s water testing methods are inaccurate because of
outdated criteria in studying water contamination, and as underutilizing the law’s “zone of
presumption”). The zone of presumption allows the DEP to presume water within 1,000 feet of
a drilling site is contaminated, putting the onus on the industry to prove otherwise. Id.
169. See id. at 7 (“We believe that some DEP employees saw the job more as serving the
industry than the public. We heard too many stories of complaints unanswered, or cavalierly
dismissed.”).
170. Id. at 48 (stating while many agency employees did their best, other employees
“appeared to show undue deference to the fracking industry, and undue indifference to citizens
with serious complaints about appalling effects they were suffering”).
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code because they were unaware of the new one.171 Attorney General Shapiro
noticed that some of the DEP employees were “unaware of crucial legal guidelines
that govern the Department’s testing program.”172 When investigating complaints
from residents regarding fracking activities, the DEP employees revealed that,
because it was not feasible to inspect each one, they would speak to the operator of
the drilling well and close the complaint if they received a picture showing there was
not an oil spill.173 The DEP’s use of outdated methods, failure to inform employees
of important rules, and decision not to allocate adequate resources to respond to
complaints can all be seen as negligent actions.174
2.

Knowing

The grand jury report introduces the DEP’s willful actions, highlighting new
violations that were done knowingly. 175 The DEP knew about impoundment
failures in solid waste management for years prior to phasing out the practice. 176
Testimony from DEP employees revealed they knew the agency required brand new
regulations for fracking “early on,” yet the regulations were not enacted until 2016. 177
Employee testimony disclosed that the DEP discouraged employees from taking
training opportunities and ignored new methods gleaned from trainings. 178
The DEP was hesitant to issue Notices of Violation (NOV), which identify
violators and begin the regulatory enforcement process. 179 According to the grand

171. See id. at 56 (explaining that, despite the newly developed suit code 946, employees
continued using the pre-fracking suit code 942 because they did not know about update).
172. Id. at 58 (characterizing the DEP employees’ ignorance of certain significant legal
guidelines as “troubling”).
173. See id. at 59 (describing how the DEP employees had to “investigate” and close
complaints “without ever leaving the office” due to their lack of resources). In response to these
accusations, the DEP stated: “DEP staff investigate complaints from the public that an
unconventional gas activity may be causing environmental or public safety concerns.” Id. at 117.
174. See id. at 59 (balancing understanding that the “DEP is understaffed and employees
cannot spend all their time making inspections” with the skepticism that “operators can fairly or
effectively police themselves”).
175. See id. at 6 (stating the DEP’s failure to investigate complaints as employees “elect[ing]
not to inspect reported violations”).
176. See id. at 50 (“In the mid-2010s, DEP recognized that impoundments were not safe,
and they were phased out in favor of more secure storage methods. But by that time, DEP had
years of knowledge about impoundment failures.”). Earlier in the grand jury report, Attorney
General Shapiro describes impoundments as “man made ponds, several acres in size, where oil and
gas operators stored millions of gallons of fluid” that sometimes included toxic fluids such as
contaminated wastewater. Id. at 32. These impoundments lacked the proper lining to prevent
leakages into the soil and water and would release harmful chemicals into the air as essentially
“enormous open toxic pits.” Id. The DEP exempted these impoundments from the permitting
requirements of the Solid Waste Management Act. See id. at 32, 50.
177. See id. at 52 (demonstrating the DEP “developed concepts” for fracking regulations
years before regulations were adopted).
178. See id. at 53 (revealing employees were told outside training opportunities would violate
the “gift ban” policy).
179. See id. at 6 (explaining what NOVs are and that there was a lack of NOVs issued during
the beginning of the fracking boom); see also Compliance and Enforcement Division, PA. DEP’T ENVTL.
PROT.,
https://www.dep.pa.gov/Business/Air/CAEDivision/Pages/default.aspx
[https://perma.cc/JJ6H-Q9T7] (last visited Sept. 15, 2020) (giving overview of compliance
monitoring tools the DEP uses).
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jury report, executive decisions and communications from top staff influenced
employees, who interpreted emails as saying: “To leave the Marcellus alone. . . .
Don’t interfere with their business.” 180 These willful violations of the DEP’s duty
to protect the environment and Pennsylvania residents in favor of the regulated
industry become even more incriminatory when considering the court’s remarks in
Commonwealth v. Farmer.181 If a petroleum engineer should know how to properly
dispose of waste, an agency with environmental regulatory expertise should have
even more knowledge about the harmful impacts that could occur by ignoring or
condoning unsafe industry practices.182
IV. “UNLESS SOMEONE LIKE YOU CARES A WHOLE AWFUL LOT, NOTHING IS
GOING TO GET BETTER. IT’S NOT.”183: USING LEGISLATION AND EXECUTIVE
OUTSOURCING TO SPEAK FOR CITIZENS AND THE ENVIRONMENT
Better oversight and easier avenues for prosecution would ensure regulatory
agencies are held accountable for helping industries violate the regulations they are
meant to enforce.184 The ability to prosecute state and federal environmental
employees for blatantly violating the “foundational mission of protecting human
health and the environment” is increasingly crucial because federal agencies like the
EPA are vulnerable to changing political administrations whose policy decisions can
have lasting detrimental effects on the agency.185 Even if a large portion of an agency
remains committed to its mission, a few high-level employees can heavily sway the
entire agency’s regulatory policies.186

180. See PA. OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GEN., GRAND JURY REPORT, supra note 5, at 62–63
(alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting employee who believed “the
message was clear” not issue violations against fracking activities for Marcellus Shale wells, even
after Executive Deputy Secretary characterized email as “a misunderstanding”).
181. See Commonwealth v. Farmer, 750 A.2d 925, 929 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2000) (implying
Farmer’s knowledge as petroleum engineer makes his improper disposal of solid waste more
culpable).
182. See id. (using expertise as factor in determining degree of accountability); see also Massaro
& Brooks, supra note 92, at 169–70, 207 (cataloging defendants’ violations as misrepresenting and
concealing truth while having expertise and knowledge regarding detrimental effects of switching
water supply).
183. See SEUSS, supra note 2, at 58.
184. See Massaro & Brooks, supra note 92, at 172 (citing investigative report finding Michigan
“‘fundamentally accountable’ because agencies charged with enforcing drinking water regulations
and protecting public health had failed to do their job”).
185. See Banerjee, supra note 100 (concluding EPA is verging on regulatory capture because
business and industry, rather than scientific data and public welfare, are deciding factor in
developing policy).
186. See Hudson, supra note 99, at 672.
It should therefore be appreciated that an agency may consist of 90% individuals whose
views and decisions are perfectly aligned with the public interest, and 10% who are not,
and by that constitution still make rules and decisions that are harmful to the public
interest. It follows that an interest group may reap large benefits from the “capture” of
a relatively limited number of persons within the agency, especially high-level officials,
as, in general, an agency administrator who shares an industry’s views will be capable of
exerting greater influence in that industry’s favor than a low-level employee.
Id.
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Considering the barriers to prosecuting government officials, the important
work of employees at regulatory agencies, and the limitations they face, encouraging
widespread criminal prosecution of agency employees is not a feasible option for
situations described in Attorney General Shapiro’s grand jury report. 187 However,
by analyzing how individuals are charged and prosecuted for environmental
violations, it becomes clear that failing to act is a large part of environmental
crimes.188 When such failure comes from the regulators, the executive branch
should be able to step in to protect citizens from inaction. 189 Criminal statutes
already discourage industry actors from this crime of inaction; legislators should
similarly pass laws that effectively penalize egregious inaction from agency
executives.190
A. Criminal Charges and Pennsylvania DEP Employees
While the DEP’s employees should be protected and given the benefit of the
doubt due to the constraints of governmental work, cases of explicit corruption and
conflicts of interest should be eligible for environmental prosecution. 191 Attorney
General Shapiro’s concern with the “revolving door” of employees leaving the DEP
to work for the oil and gas industry after purposefully under-regulating the industry
is analogous to the situation of Lester M. Crawford, the FDA Commissioner who
was criminally prosecuted for owning stock in the companies he regulated.192 The
failure to act according to one’s duty as a government employee for the future receipt
of monetary compensation should be no different than a private individual failing
to follow environmental regulations in order to maximize profits. 193 For example,
Attorney General Shapiro reviewed a DEP employee’s testimony regarding a drilling

187. See Uhlmann, Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note 30, at 163 (discussing benefits of giving
heightened prosecutorial discretion for those enforcing environmental crimes).
188. See KRAMER, supra note 1, at 91 (“These nondecisions constitute a significant portion
of the state climate crimes of political omission.”).
189. See PA. OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GEN., GRAND JURY REPORT, supra note 5, at 102
(recommending law be amended to “give the Attorney General direct jurisdiction over
environmental crimes”).
190. See KRAMER, supra note 1, at 90 (“State crimes of omission occur when states and their
officials fail to act, or neglect to notice bad things happening, or even enter into a state of denial.
This leads to significant, even life-threatening occasions for harm to particular groups of people
simply because state officials have not acted.” (quoting ROB WATTS, STATE OF VIOLENCE AND
THE CIVILIZING PROCESS: ON CRIMINOLOGY AND STATE CRIME 10 (2016))); see also PA. OFFICE
OF ATTORNEY GEN., GRAND JURY REPORT, supra note 5, at 9 (“We urge the executive and
legislative branches of Pennsylvania’s government to seriously consider the findings of this Report,
and to act in favor of the common good of Pennsylvania and its citizens. We think there is more
that can and must be done to minimize the hazards arising from unconventional drilling.”).
191. See PA. OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GEN., GRAND JURY REPORT, supra note 5, at 102
(arguing “criminal charges can provide an effective way to help carry out the constitutional mandate
of article 1, section 27: to conserve and maintain the people’s right to clean air, pure water, and a
healthy environment”).
192. See id. at 100 (witnessing concerning and “troubling” staffing issues such as temptation
the DEP employees would hesitate “to bear the full force of the law” in hopes of later attaining
higher paying industry job); Harris, supra note 88.
193. See KRAMER, supra note 1, at 124 (describing “critical delay” in government response to
global warming made through deliberate decisions motivated by economic gains as “predatory and
criminal”).

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2022

29

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 66, Iss. 6 [2022], Art. 2

46

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW: TOLLE LEGE

[Vol. 66

well that the agency allowed to shutdown unsafely using a method called
“plugging.”194 The employee responsible had left the DEP to work for the company
“to whom the certificates were issued.”195
B. Outsourcing Prosecution to Executives
The grand jury report introduced a better way to handle the intersection of
agency misconduct and criminal prosecution: outsource state environmental
criminal investigations to other parts of the executive branch by allowing the Office
of the Attorney General to receive citizen complaints and investigate them.196
According to the report, “the lack of criminal prosecution” for environmental
violations is not due to a lack of crimes occurring but rather due to bureaucratic
obstacles.197 Although the Commonwealth Attorneys Act gives the Attorney
General the power to prosecute criminal charges against Pennsylvania officials and
employees whose behavior hurts “the public trust,” the DEP must refer criminal
conduct to the Office of the Attorney General before the Office can investigate and
prosecute environmental misconduct.198 The general assembly should amend the
law to “give the Attorney General direct jurisdiction over environmental crimes” so
that the office “can begin an investigation on its own, whenever it has proper cause
to do so” without waiting for the DEP referrals that rarely come.199 Giving the DEP

194. See Sanserino, supra note 44 (discussing the DEP’s revisions to well-plugging regulations
for unconventional wells). Plugging involves sealing off inactive and abandoned wells to prevent
leakage of gas into the air, water, and soil. See id.
195. PA. OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GEN., GRAND JURY REPORT, supra note 5, at 60 (clarifying
that, while such a “career progression was not uncommon,” the revolving door between the DEP
and the industry “is not a recipe for restoring public confidence in the DEP inspection process”).
196. See id. at 102 (detailing potential solutions to avoid situation created by fracking boom
in Pennsylvania); see also Abrams, supra note 87, at 207 (“As long as law enforcement power is kept
in the hands of those who are themselves corrupt, the public interest is frustrated. The only hope
lies in vesting jurisdiction in an outside body that has the capacity and the will to investigate and
prosecute as needed.” (quoting WHITNEY NORTH SEYMOUR, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY 174–
75 (1975))).
197. See PA. OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GEN., GRAND JURY REPORT, supra note 5, at 102
(explaining that, despite Attorney General’s Office “special environmental crimes section,” the
Office is unable to investigate and prosecute unless the DEP first asks it to do so); see also The
Commonwealth Attorneys Act of 1980, 71 PA. STAT. § 732-205(a)(6) (1980). When criminal
prosecutions intersect with agency enforcement, the attorney general must wait for the agency’s
investigation and referral. See § 732-205(a)(6). Because the DEP is already “understaffed” and
underfunded, it would be much more efficient for the agency to circumvent the investigation and
referral process and share jurisdiction with the Attorney General’s environmental crimes unit. See
PA. OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GEN., GRAND JURY REPORT, supra note 5, at 59.
198. See § 732-205(a)(1), (6); PA. OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GEN., GRAND JURY REPORT, supra
note 5, at 59.
Yet, in recent years DEP has seldom asked. DEP employees testified to various
explanations for this lack of criminal referrals for oil and gas violations. Some said they
don’t need to seek criminal prosecutions, because their own internal regulations provide
sufficient deterrence. Some said they would refer more cases, if only prosecution didn’t
take so long. Some said they wanted to send out cases for prosecution, but supervisors
didn’t always approve.
PA. OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GEN., GRAND JURY REPORT, supra note 5, at 102.
199. See id. (suggesting environmental laws be amended to give Attorney General direct
jurisdiction over criminal environmental violations).
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and the Attorney General concurrent jurisdiction over environmental criminal
investigations would spread the administrative burden, thus, contributing more
oversight and resources to curbing environmental misconduct. 200 Outsourcing
enforcement and oversight of both individuals and agencies would allow for more
frequent, effective execution of environmental law.201
One commentator has emphasized the importance of moderating bureaucracy
with “an informed public capable of holding administrators and public officials
accountable” in order to remedy the issue of environmental regulation oversight.202
While an informed and educated public is a crucial check on the government’s
power, the responsibility of regulating an entire industry should fall on the agency
created to do so, not citizens who may potentially lack the time, resources, and
expertise necessary to do so.203 Nevertheless, even citizens with those resources still
need the legislative tools to pursue claims of accountability against the
government.204
C. Creating Legislation that Deters Inaction
In addition to outsourcing investigative powers to law enforcement, legislation
should be passed at state and federal levels that addresses agency inaction. 205
Amending current legislation and passing new legislation at both the state and
federal level would give citizens a stronger legal basis for bringing claims against
egregious failures of government.206 This Comment proposes two legislative
200. See id. (indicating Attorney General’s Office has resources to prosecute environmental
crimes through its specialized environmental crimes division but not authority, whereas the DEP
has authority to pursue and refer environmental crimes but lacks funding, staffing, and internal
policies to do so).
201. See Abrams, supra note 87, at 226 (“If enforcement actions are to be undertaken in
situations involving complex relationships such as these, they cry out for them to be carried on by
officials who have significant distance from the matter, the people involved, and probably the
jurisdiction itself.”).
202. Morgan, supra note 69, at 92 (answering question of “[w]ho shall watch the watchers
themselves?” in context of hydraulic fracturing and agency regulations (alteration in original)
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons: The
Population Has No Technical Solution; It Requires a Fundamental Extension in Morality, 162 SCI. 1243,
1245–46 (1968))).
203. See id. at 112 (arguing data suggests public education and awareness of adverse effects
of fracking is greater deterrent than regulation in reducing industry expansion).
204. See Massaro & Brooks, supra note 92, at 158 (describing equal protection claims
plaintiffs brought against Flint officials as “doctrinally fragile” and unable to properly hold officials
accountable).
205. See id. at 182 (“There was no perfect fit between the Flint debacle and any existing,
formal constitutional category that protected the residents from such environmental harms. Each
of the constitutional claims was a salmon argument, swimming upstream against multiple adverse
doctrinal currents.”).
206. See Markell, supra note 95, at 17 (describing how government tools of enforcing
environmental laws can turn into obstacles obscuring culpability and transparency). “These
seemingly fundamental features of governance have the potential to create substantial ‘slack’ and
to reduce rather than increase openness and accountability in governance.” Id. But see Pennsylvania’s
Environmental Rights Amendment Grows Some Teeth, CIRCLE OF BLUE (Feb. 22, 2018),
https://www.circleofblue.org/2018/world/pennsylvanias-environmental-rights-amendmentgrows-teeth/ [https://perma.cc/4AS7-2LP7] (tracing evolution of Pennsylvania Constitution’s
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changes to safeguard the public interest against agency inaction: adding direct-review
provisions to environmental legislation that explicitly waive finality and imposing a
duty to act on environmental agencies.
1.

Adding and Amending Direct-Review Provisions

Environmental agencies can currently avoid most litigation over inaction, in
part due to the difficulty of applying the APA when harm arises from the failure to
act rather than from action.207 One commentator describes this asymmetry as a
“deregulatory bias,” where deliberate nonenforcement faces little to no judicial
review, while large surges in enforcement give individuals the opportunity to bring
cases, even though both can cause the same amount of damage. 208 The
commentator then asserted deregulatory bias could be appropriate because
“nonenforcement does not threaten individual liberties in the same way as
enforcement.”209 However, as demonstrated by the grand jury report and discussed
case law, in environmental law, nonenforcement is just as bad—and often even
worse—than enforcement.210

Environmental Rights Amendment). While originally more aspirational than effective, in recent
years courts have given more credence to the Environmental Rights Amendment, which guarantees
Pennsylvania citizens the right to clean air, clean water, and the conservation of natural resources.
See id. This amendment to the Pennsylvania constitution has resulted in citizens successfully
bringing cases addressing environmental issues and fracking. See id.; see also PA. CONST. art. 1, § 27
(1971) (codifying Environmental Rights Amendment); Pa. Envtl. Def. Found. v. Commonwealth,
161 A.3d 911 (Pa. 2017) (strengthening Environmental Rights Amendment and its effectiveness
for citizens bringing suits against state).
207. For a further discussion of the difficulty of applying the APA to nonenforcement, see
supra Part II.D; see also Hylas, supra note 106, at 1675–76 (discussing ways agencies avoid judicial
review). Hylas mentions an exception in Section 706(1) of the APA that allows the court to force
an action that is “unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed” before the action is considered
final. See Hylas, supra note 106, at 1675–76. The Supreme Court then limited this exception to
cases where “the agency fails to take discrete action that it is statutorily required to take.” Id.
Therefore, in situations such as fracking in Pennsylvania or the climate change crisis, even with the
Section 706(1) exception there would still be standing issues for a case of government inaction
leading to egregious public harms. See id. (offering unreasonable delay provision as potential
structure to help frame issue of “finality” in determining agency actions).
208. See Velikonja, supra note 103, at 1562 (describing Heckler v. Chaney’s effect on
nonenforcement and subsequent disproportionality of judicial review available for shifts in
enforcement versus nonenforcement).
209. Id.
210. See Massaro & Brooks, supra note 92, at 192 (asserting that life, liberty, and property
were “undeniably compromised” by government officials in the Flint water crisis); see also Juliana v.
United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224, 1249 (D. Or. 2016) (reviewing claim that government actors
“have so profoundly damaged our home planet that they threaten plaintiffs’ fundamental
constitutional rights to life and liberty”), rev’d and remanded by 947 F.3d 1159 (9th Cir. 2020); PA.
OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GEN., GRAND JURY REPORT, supra note 5. Plaintiffs in Juliana brought suit
under the Due Process Clause, arguing a safe and healthy environment is “a necessary condition to
exercising other rights to life, liberty, and property.” Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1250. Judge Aiken
discussed the possibility of “new” fundamental rights, relying on Justice Kennedy’s words from
Obergefell v. Hodges:
The nature of injustice is that we may not always see it in our own times. The
generations that wrote and ratified the Bill of Rights . . . did not presume to know the
extent of freedom in all its dimensions, and so they entrusted to future generations a
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One way around this problem involves adding direct-review provisions to
environmental legislation that clearly state finality is not required absent explicit
statutory language to the contrary.211 When a direct-review provision is silent on
finality, courts typically presume finality is required and dismiss inaction claims. 212
The presumption of finality in environmental statutes such as the CWA has spawned
confusion over a court’s power to review inaction claims, leading to disparate
outcomes depending on where in the country one lives. 213 To rectify this problem
of judicial guesswork, federal environmental legislation should be amended to
include direct-review provisions that explicitly do not require finality to challenge an
action.214
Potential criticisms for this measure echo the reasons that support the inclusion
of the finality requirement within APA Section 704: fears about waves of litigation
for ongoing action, overstepping agency authority regarding resource allocation, and
hindering agency rulemaking.215 But courts will still have other tools to limit judicial
review to appropriate cases, such as the ripeness doctrine, which considers “whether
an issue is ‘fit’ for review” along with “the potential hardship to the parties of
withholding review.”216

charter protecting the right of all persons to enjoy liberty as we learn its meaning. When
new insight reveals discord between the Constitution’s central protections and a received
legal stricture, a claim to liberty must be addressed.
Id. at 1249 (quoting Obergefell v. Hodges, 567 U.S. 644, 664 (2015)). For a further discussion of
the harm that can result from inaction, see supra Part II.
211. See Borgert, supra note 108, at 155 (explaining APA allows parties to challenge “a
nonfinal action directly reviewable under another statute” under APA).
212. See Bell v. New Jersey, 461 U.S. 773, 778 (1982) (establishing presumption of finality
requirement when direct-review statute is silent); Borgert, supra note 108, 152–54 (discussing
different approaches to presumption of finality requirement taken by federal circuit courts).
213. See Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b) (2018) (not explicitly requiring final agency
action before judicial review); Iowa League of Cities v. EPA, 711 F.3d 844, 863 (8th Cir. 2013)
(finding finality not required); Champion Int’l Corp. v. U.S. EPA, 850 F.2d 182, 187 (4th Cir. 1988)
(requiring finality under CWA); Pa. Dep’t of Envtl. Resources v. EPA, 618 F.2d 991 (3d Cir. 1980)
(requiring finality under CWA); see also Borgert, supra note 108, at 158 (discussing circuit split over
existence and reasoning behind CWA’s finality requirement).
214. To overcome this presumption of finality, plaintiffs must show the court that a statute
contains no “explicit finality language” as well as the existence of other, “fairly discernable” factors
indicating Congress’s intent. Borgert, supra note 108, at 179 (second internal quotation marks
omitted). Explicit statutory text could eliminate much judicial “discernment” of Congress’s intent.
215. See Heckel, supra note 115, at 825 (maintaining requirements such as finality protect
decision-making processes of agencies); see also Borgert, supra note 108, at 161 (reiterating policy
reasons judges have cited to support a finality requirement, including the fear that “unlimited
interlocutory review could seriously impede the performance of the EPA’s rulemaking functions”
(quoting Pa. Dep’t of Envtl. Resources, 618 F.2d at 997)); Biber, supra note 116, at 467–68 (identifying
resource allocation as one of the main areas of discretion necessary to the executive branch and its
agencies); Parsons, supra note 117, at 510 (noting APA seeks to limit “undue judicial interference”
and “avoid judicial entanglement in abstract policy disagreements which courts lack the expertise
and information to resolve” (quoting Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness, 55 U.S. 55, 55 (2004))). But see
FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 20 (1998) (finding suit for inaction warranted when injury was kind
statute sought to address and was supported explicitly by language of statute).
216. See Borgert, supra note 108, at 180 (arguing ripeness doctrine is sufficient to assess
suitableness of judicial review in absence of finality requirement and describing ripeness doctrine’s
“two-pronged inquiry”).
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Other constraints for parties attempting to challenge agency inaction would
prevent an onslaught of litigation and ensure only cases with concrete and
addressable harms are reviewed.217 Furthermore, portions of the APA and
environmental statutes were drafted in order to increase agency accountability to the
public.218 Removing the finality requirement in certain direct-review provisions of
environmental statutes would promote agency accountability and guarantee that
injured parties are not unfairly left without recourse merely because their injury arose
from inaction rather than action.219
2.

Imposing a Duty to Act

Congress should pass federal legislation imposing a duty to act onto
environmental agencies through a mechanism similar to the Responsible Corporate
Officer (RCO) doctrine.220 Statutorily requiring an agency to create a regulation that
includes a duty to act explicitly directed at executive agency officials, similar to the
Responsible Corporate Officer doctrine present in the CWA and CAA, would target
inaction and give citizens firmer standing. 221 The RCO doctrine imposes a duty to
act by holding that “corporate officials, who stand in a responsible relationship to a
violation, can be prosecuted for their failure to prevent the violation.”222 This

217. See Parsons, supra note 117, at 509 (listing “daunting number of obstacles” litigants must
overcome before reaching court that would still be in place even if finality requirement was
removed for certain environmental claims). Challenges include standing, remedy exhaustion, issue
exhaustion, and preclusion. See id.
218. See id. at 523 (discussing notice-and-comment procedures of APA § 553 that “were
intended to make agencies more accountable to the public”); see also Borgert, supra note 108, at 174
(reviewing legislative history of amendments to CWA and finding Congress wanted to give public
ample opportunities to participate in reviewing and challenging environmental rules and violations).
219. See Borgert, supra note 108, at 145 (stating “[r]eview is categorically unavailable under
the APA for a claim” if it fails to meet the finality requirement). Borgert argues removing this
finality requirement would enable “social welfare gains” that are “currently precluded by the finality
rule’s strict requirements.” See id. at 191; see also Hylas, supra note 106, at 1648, 1650 (explaining
Bennett test for finality “can make it exceptionally difficult for beneficiaries of regulation . . . to
challenge potentially dangerous deregulatory agency programs” and “plaintiffs have a harder time
establishing final agency action and thus more difficulty challenging the rule in court”).
220. See 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c)(6) (2018) (codifying Responsible Corporate Officer doctrine
into CAA by defining “person” as including “any responsible corporate officer” within section of
statute discussing criminal penalties for negligence); see also 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(6) (2018)
(incorporating Responsible Corporate Officer doctrine into CWA in same way as CAA); The Climate
Act, GRANTHAM RES. INST. ON CLIMATE CHANGE & THE ENV’T, https://climatelaws.org/geographies/denmark/laws/the-climate-act [https://perma.cc/F5GG-YQLB] (last
visited Mar. 17, 2021). The idea of compelling government action through legislation in the field
of environmental law, especially within international climate change law, is not completely new or
unheard of. See The Climate Act, supra. In 2020, Denmark passed the Climate Act, which sets
emissions targets the Danish government is obligated to meet. See id.
221. See The Climate Act, supra note 220; see also Uhlmann, Environmental Crimes, supra note 25,
at 1240–41 (describing Responsible Corporate Officer doctrine in context of CWA and CAA).
222. See Uhlmann, Environmental Crimes, supra note 25, at 1240–41 (explaining how RCO
doctrine functions).
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doctrine works well in the context of environmental law because it prompts officials
to intervene when harm would otherwise occur if action was not taken.223
This obligation to act should be applied to those in the greatest position to fight
environmental violations: agency officials.224 Instead of resulting in criminal charges,
however, an agency official’s duty to act should give individuals a better avenue to
confront government inaction and, in cases where the courts deem it appropriate,
encourage agency action.225 Citizens in Flint, Michigan were forced to bring flimsy
constitutional claims for a failure to act to protect their drinking waters because there
were no other applicable avenues for redress.226 If environmental statutes included
a duty to act, those citizens would have a stronger claim against officials who failed
to ensure the city’s waters were not poisoned.227 Furthermore, plaintiffs battling the
ever-growing climate crisis, like those in Juliana, would have firmer standing to bring
their suits in the pursuit of environmental justice. 228
Duty to Act legislation would establish and codify Congress’s intent that the
mission of environmental agencies above all should be to protect the environment
and American citizens from harms caused by business and industry interests. 229 It
would also formally recognize that, especially in the field of environmental law,
failing to act is just as bad, or sometimes worse than, acting inadequately.230 This
type of thinking is already recognized in environmental law through the Responsible

223. See id. at 1241 (noting RCO doctrine ensures “corporate officials with authority over
environmental compliance cannot ignore violations they know are occurring and have the ability
to prevent”).
224. See Markell, supra note 95, at 24 (explaining state agencies have worked with EPA to
gain increasing autonomy).
225. See Massaro & Brooks, supra note 92, at 172 (recognizing “formidable procedural and
substantive obstacles” plaintiffs faced when bringing lawsuits after Flint water crisis); see also Juliana
v. United States, 947 F.3d 1159, 1169, 1175 (9th Cir. 2020) (explaining plaintiff’s sole claim was a
constitutional one and not a claim alleging violation of a statute or regulation). The court reversed
and remanded the case for lack of Article III standing due to redressability, suggesting the best
recourse for addressing climate change harms in the absence of legislatively-defined redress is to
“goad the political branches into action.” See Juliana, 947 F.3d at 1175.
226. See Massaro & Brooks, supra note 92, at 157 (stating Flint crisis exposed “many
weaknesses of constitutional law” when confronted with complex environmental harms derived
from government official misconduct and irresponsibility).
227. Compare Juliana, 947 F.3d at 1169, 1175 (noting plaintiff failed to raise actionable
statutory or regulatory violations), with FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 20–21 (1998) (finding
respondents raised statutory violation by asserting agency’s failure to provide information to
respondents was “injury in fact”). Because the statute at issue in Akins sought to promote
information-gathering, withholding that information was an injury. See Akins, 524 U.S. at 20–21.
228. See Juliana, 947 F.3d at 1164 (acknowledging plaintiffs brought “compelling evidence”
that government promotion of fossil fuels, with the knowledge that such behavior “can cause
catastrophic climate change,” exacerbated climate crisis).
229. See KRAMER, supra note 1, at 199 (characterizing climate change as political problem,
rather than a technical one, and stating that public must participate in holding industry and state
accountable for climate).
230. See id. at 87 (discussing Court Judge Aiken’s assertions in Juliana that “the government
will have to stand trial for its actions and omissions concerning climate change”). The dissenting
opinion disparaged the majority’s decision to dismiss the case for lack of standing: “Despite
countless studies over the last half century warning of the catastrophic consequences of
anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions, many of which the government conducted, the
government not only failed to act but also ‘affirmatively promote[d] fossil fuel use in a host of
ways.’” Juliana, 947 F.3d at 1176 (Staton, J., dissenting) (alteration in original) (quoting id. at 1167).
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Corporate Officer doctrine, enshrined in the CWA and CAA. 231 Enacting legislation
or amending current environmental statutes to condemn inaction would recognize
that government officials, just like corporate officers, have a similar, if not greater,
duty to act and the necessary authority to do so. 232
V. “TREAT IT WITH CARE. GIVE IT CLEAN WATER. AND FEED IT FRESH
AIR.”233: THE IMPACT OF EMBOLDENING ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION
While public education is an effective tool in checking administrative action,
systemic problems facing environmental law and environmental agencies need to be
addressed.234 These issues include a lack of money, resources, and incentives given
to environmental agencies and its hardworking government employees. 235
Outsourcing environmental prosecutions from the DEP to the Pennsylvania
Attorney General’s Office would allow greater oversight and alleviate the burden on
environmental state agencies who are overwhelmed and underfunded.236 Passing
legislation that penalizes agency inaction would reiterate a point already apparent in
criminal provisions of environmental statutes: simple negligence can be criminal
when it endangers public welfare.237 In order to help environmental agencies achieve
their missions and to better safeguard the environment and its citizens, these
measures should be implemented to ensure the next unconventional technology
does not operate for decades at the expense of innocent lives and the health of the
environment.238

231. See Uhlmann, Environmental Crimes, supra note 25, at 1241 (reasoning RCO doctrine does
not deviate from typical environmental law standards and objectives but rather helps achieve them
by imposing a duty to act on officials with authority to do so).
232. See id. (providing public policy reasons for holding officials responsible for negligence
and failing to act).
233. See SEUSS, supra note 2, at 61.
234. See Morgan, supra note 69, at 114 (“The empirical results illustrate that education has
the largest effect on the rate of new drilling in a given state in a certain year.”).
235. See Pennsylvania’s Environmental Rights Amendment Grows Some Teeth, supra note 206 (“The
most recent state budget left the Department of Environmental Protection with no new money,
despite receiving warning letters from the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency about
Pennsylvania’s lagging performance in reducing nutrient pollution to the Susquehanna River and
the Chesapeake Bay, and the state’s shortcomings in ensuring public drinking water safety.”
(emphasis added)).
236. See PA. OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GEN., GRAND JURY REPORT, supra note 5, at 101
(contending the DEP is “understaffed and undertrained” and in need of more resources).
237. See id. at 11 (“This is the time to learn our lesson for the future: who will bear the
inevitable risks? We say it should be those who exploit the resources, not those who live among
them. That means let industry pay the price of harm reduction, and let government take the time
to get it right before we hand over the keys. And for the present, let us at least do all we can to
catch up.”).
238. See id. (describing succession of resource exploitation that has occurred in Pennsylvania,
from timber to coal to, most recently, shale oil).
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